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ANCHORAGE, ALASKA - THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 2009
(Historic Courtroom)
(On record at 9:05:41 a.m.)
THE COURT:  Good morning, everyone.  This is case
number F08-00110-DMD, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska. 
We'll start with the telephonic appearances today. 
Mr. Elsaesser, are you there?  
MR. ELSAESSER:  Yes, I'm here for the Catholic
Church Communities of Northern Alaska, commonly referred to as
the parishes, with my assistant, Donna LaRue.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  John Martinek?
FATHER MARTINEK:  Yes, I'm here (indiscernible -
telephonics) Catholic Church Communities of Northern Alaska.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Father Robert Fafth?
FATHER FAFTH:  I'm here on behalf of the Catholic
Church Communities of Northern Alaska, along with Jim
Hasselberger, who is on my finance council.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Eliza Jones?
MS. JONES:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Ms. Jones, are you there?
MS. JONES:  Yes, I am.
THE COURT:  Okay.  And for whom are you appearing
today?  
MS. JONES:  The Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska.
THE COURT:  Okay.  And Ms. Susan Murphy?
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MS. MURPHY:  Yes.  I'm Susan Murphy, and I'm
representing the Catholic Church Communities of Northern
Alaska.  
THE COURT:  David Paige? 
MR. PAIGE:  Your Honor, yes, David Paige on behalf
of the debtor, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska.
THE COURT:  Rebecca Rhoades?  
MS. RHOADES:  Yes, Your Honor, appearing on behalf
of various tort claimants.
THE COURT:  Dennis LaGory and David Spector?
MR. LAGORY:  Yes, Your Honor, appearing on behalf of
the Catholic Mutual defendants.
THE COURT:  Michael Pompeo and William Corbett?
MR. POMPEO:  Yes, Your Honor, Michael Pompeo of
Drinker, Biddle & Reath on behalf of Travelers Casualty and
Surety Company.  Your Honor, Mr. Corbett is not admitted yet
pro hac vice, but I would ask the Court's permission and
indulgence to allow him to participate telephonically. 
THE COURT:  He can.
MR. POMPEO:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Mr. Nash?
MR. NASH:  Yes, Patrick Nash on behalf of
Continental Insurance Company.
THE COURT:  Mr. Dykstra?
MR. DYKSTRA:  Present on behalf of Alaska National
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THE COURT:  Young Kim?
MR. KIM:  Present.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  Here in Anchorage, we'll start on
my far left, and we'll have counsel state their appearances 
for the record.  
MR. EKBERG:  Charles Ekberg, Lane Powell, on behalf
of the Continental Insurance Company.  
MR. ORGEL:  Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Good morning.
MR. ORGEL:  Robert Orgel, Pachulski Stang --
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. ORGEL:  Here for the official committee of
unsecured creditors.
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. STANG:  Good morning, Your Honor.  Jim Stang for
the committee.
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Bundy, you're going to
be quiet today?  
MR. BUNDY:  I hope so, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  
(Laughter)
MS. BOSWELL:  Good morning, Your Honor.  Susan
Boswell, Quarles & Brady on behalf of the Catholic Bishop of
Northern Alaska, and Bishop Kettler is present in the
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MR. MILLS:  Michael Mills of Dorsey & Whitney, also
on behalf of Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  Well, we've got a couple of
different motions on for a hearing.  I thought we'd start with
the UCC's motion for authority to commence, prosecute, and
settle litigation on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, and I
think the debtor's motion to strike would obviously be
included in that, and we'd deal with the motion for authority
to prosecute, and then after that, get to the disclosure
statement and argue that separately, if that's okay with you,
Ms. Boswell, and you, Mr. Stang.  I take --
MR. STANG:  That's fine with me, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Then why don't you take the lead
and we'll start with the UCC's motion for authority to
commence litigation.  
MR. STANG:  Thank you, Your Honor.  Your Honor,
actually, I think I'll start off with the motion to strike.
THE COURT:  Go right ahead.
MR. STANG:  I know you usually have the moving party
go first, but that's where I'd like to start.  
Your Honor, you should deny the motion because the
interests of this case and the interest of creditors require
that there be a hearing on the merits of the standing motion. 
And the interests of survivors of sexual abuse should not --
Case 08-00110    Doc 524    Filed 08/31/09    Entered 08/31/09 09:33:13    Desc Main





























and, frankly, all creditors, because the standing motion seeks
to recover property that would benefit the entire estate and
not just a class of survivor creditors -- should not be
penalized because of some missed deadlines that in retrospect,
given the timing of the filing of the pleadings and when this
hearing has actually been conducted, do not prejudice the
parties in any way and we hope did not unduly inconvenience
the Court in the consideration of the motions.  In fact, the
reply that was filed is now 45 days old in terms of
relationship to this hearing date, notwithstanding the OSC
regarding violation of the automatic stay, which was not a
violation of the committee.  
My firm and the committee and Mr. Bundy do not have
a history of ignoring your rules and ignoring your orders. 
Mr. Rafatjoo at the May 7th hearing brought up the scheduling
of the redacted motion and the reply and explained the reasons
that we missed the deadline, and we missed it, for the filing
of the redacted motion.  Your OSC order came in on a Thursday
afternoon when I was attending some other business in
Portland.  The mediation started the following Monday, it
required travel both times, and while Ms. Boswell is certainly
right I all but bragged that we could have the redacted motion
turned around in hours because it really just involved the
elimination of, I think, less than three lines of text, it
didn't get done.  We didn't get a call from the diocese
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saying, “Jim, you missed it,” but that speaks probably more
towards how the parties are dealing with each other right now,
and it's probably a shame that that's the -- kind of the
relationship we're having, but that didn't happen either.
I've always tried to be careful about putting words
in the Court's mouth, but we felt that when you allowed at
that May 7th hearing another short -- well, you rescheduled,
essentially, the deadline for filing the motion, you accepted
our explanation.  I'm sure Mr. Rafatjoo expressed his
apologies for missing the deadlines, and we thought that was
the end of the matter, but it wasn't because the diocese
refused to withdraw the motion even though in this setting,
given that there's no jury, given that you could easily read
around those few offending lines, that this had to go forward.
As far as the timeliness of the initial reply is
concerned, we were under the impression, but clearly not in
conformity with the rules, that the practice of the Court was
to make sure the replies got in on time, well before the
hearings so that it could be heard with the Court having a
chance to review the replies.  Forty-five days have now
passed, and when -- given the context of the importance of the
issues we're talking about and the lack of prejudice to the
parties, and, again, I hope not to the inconvenience of the
Court, that the Court should allow the matter to be heard on a
substantive basis.  It is essential to the progress of this
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case.  Striking the motion and the issues the motion raises,
which are the viability of avoidance actions, both as to the
Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska and as to the parish
properties and then the other avoidance actions we mentioned
doesn't make the issue go away.  These are all issues that
will be heard in the context of plan confirmation, be it in
the context of the fair and equitable test or the best
interest of creditors test.  
And Mr. Orgel will spend a little more -- Mr. Orgel
is going to handle the disclosure statement aspect of the
hearing, and he'll go into some more detail as to why we think
the standing motion still should proceed, notwithstanding what
I just said about how these issues will resurrect in the
context of plan confirmation.  But there are no judicial
efficiencies, economies, or really any practical purpose
served by striking the substantive motion.  
So with that, Your Honor, I'd like to turn to the
substantive motion.  
There is no reasonable argument to be made that in
the Ninth Circuit you lack the authority or the jurisdiction
of the power to give the committee standing to bring an
avoidance action motion over the objection of the debtor.  The
cases that Ms. Boswell and I have been throwing back and forth
at one another are a little off point in the sense that they
primarily deal with committees who are either seeking
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co-plaintiff status with the debtor or are proceeding -- or
trustee or with the consent of the trustee.  And Judge
Gerber (ph) in his Adelphia (ph) opinion at 330 B.R. 364 does
a nice job of saying, look, there are three circumstances
where this comes up:  one, where the committee and the debtor
are co-plaintiffs -- seek co-plaintiff status; second, where
the debtor is silent and doesn't oppose; and, third, where the
debtor actually opposes.  
And when you drill down a little bit on the Ninth
Circuit authorities we've cited, the case that seems to -- 
post-act case that seems to start this discussion is Corey
(ph) versus Sorenson (ph), which is cited, I believe, by the
parties or at least cited within the authorities.  It's a
Ninth Circuit BAP decision.  It was a lawsuit by creditors to
bring a 548 action and to avoid stock under California law. 
The debtor opposed the committee status to move forward with
the action, and the court said, “If a creditor is dissatisfied
with a lack of action on the part of the debtor in possession,
the creditor may petition the court to compel the debtor in
possession to act or to gain court permission to institute the
action itself.”
The Spokane Bankruptcy Court in its trial decision
which was reversed and remanded but not on this issue, made
clear that relying on the authority of the Third Circuit in
Cybergenics (ph), it could assign the committee the powers to
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avoid -- I'm sorry, the BFP powers under 544(a)(3).  Now,
Judge Williams didn't give us those powers, although in her
opinion on the debt relief action, she said--we'll get to this
a little bit later--that if we did have those powers, we would
succeed vis-a-vis a resulting trust, something that Judge
Quackenbush (ph) didn't agree with, but she did say she could
assign the powers to the committee.  When you --
THE COURT:  How about some of the other cases?
MR. STANG:  Well, let me talk about that.  You have
another Ninth Circuit decision called Spaulding Composites --
I'm sorry, the other cases, the diocese cases?
THE COURT:  Right.
MR. STANG:  The matter, as I understand it from my
general recollection and based on Ms. Boswell's papers, did
not come up in Tucson. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. STANG:  She says that all the parties were well
aware of the property issue and the parishes provided
settlements that contributed towards the plan.  In this case,
at least to date, no parishes have stepped up in any of the
mediations as far as we've ever been told.  You know, there's
nothing in the plan that -- where the parishes join in to say
that they're going to make a financial contribution.  
In the Portland decision--and I think I sat in on
this first-day hearing--it was almost taken as a given that
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the committee could proceed, and I don't even remember the
debtor actually objecting.  
In Spokane we asked three times.  We were turned
down each time.  The case -- eventually the debtor filed the
avoidance actions, but the case had settled already and we
were just awaiting for plan confirmation.  So, frankly, it was
more of a placeholder than anything else.  And I know there's
no evidence per se.  I was counseled there, and Mr. Cross, who
was debtor's counsel, said to me that if the plan blew up and
those actions had to proceed, he expected that the committee
would step in.  But Judge Williams, as I said, indicated in
her opinion that she had certainly the authority to give it.
In San Diego, it was contested, and Judge Adler --
two of us, and Judge Adler allowed us to proceed on a number
of test parishes, and I don't remember exactly how many.  It
was -- she had a -- I think I know why she picked the
particular parishes she did.  It had to do with a construction
motion, much like the one you confronted earlier in the case,
and I think she just went down the list of the parishes where
construction was going on and said do these. 
Davenport, we were committee counsel, it didn't come
up.  And part of the reason it didn't come up was -- it -- the
relationship between the parishes and the diocese was always
in the background, but the Iowa parishes have been
incorporated for over a hundred years.  All of the deeds are
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in their name, I think, save one, which was transferred on the
eve of the bankruptcy to the parish.  And so from a BFP
perspective, you know, that was a done deal.  We had other
ways of trying to attack the relationships, but it wasn't
through 544(a)(3).
I am counsel in the Jesuit case, though we have
conflict counsel for issues regarding this.  This discussion
has come up before Judge Perris.  She has told us to talk
about it, meaning the province and the committee, but we
really haven't had that conversation yet.  So I'm sorry that
took a little while, but that was -- that's the head count.
The case that we do -- one of the cases we bounce
back and forth is the Spaulding Composites case, which is
another Ninth Circuit decision.  That would fall in
Judge Gerber's category of probably the debtor consenting. 
But when you look at the Spaulding case, it cites cases where
there was opposition from the debtor in connection with the
committee standing.  And so while Spaulding itself was a case
where there was no debtor opposition, and it may have been
stipulated, or at least there was no opposition, it cites the
Louisiana World Exposition case from the Fifth Circuit, which
was clearly a case where the debtor opposed the committee
standing, and STN Enterprises, which was a Second Circuit
case, where the debtor opposed the committee standing because
they were suing -- Mrs. Noyasu (ph) was the survivor of the
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So it seems to us that whether you're talking about
cases where the debtor -- the case facts are that the debtor
is opposing or the cases where the debtor is either not
opposing or actually cooperating with the committee, in the
Ninth Circuit the authorities cited include cases where the
debtor was opposing.  
In your decision in Era Aviation, the debtor was
clearly opposing.  I do not remember from the opinion that you
ruled on your authority to grant the committee the power, but
you certainly ruled that the lawsuit being proposed by the
committee was unjustified, given that there was a settlement
that had been reached with the debtor and one of the major
creditors that allowed the plan of reorganization to proceed. 
But you didn't say that you didn't have the authority to give
the standing.  
And so given that you have the authority, what would
be the standard for giving us the authority?  The claim has to
be colorable and we have to have made a demand.  We did that. 
The debtor has to have unjustifiably refused.  There is
language that talks about abuse of discretion by the debtor in
refusing.  The diocese says it's a high standard of abuse of
discretion.  I haven't seen any cases that use the word “high
standard.”  I'm not sure I understand what high standard means
as opposed to -- or as opposed to just abuse.  It has to be a
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colorable claim, and it has to be beneficial to the estate. 
And I want to turn to the beneficial to the estate
part, because that seems to be -- there seem to be two issues
that the diocese really focuses on.  One is whether it's
beneficial to the estate, and the second is, is there a
colorable claim.  As to whether it's beneficial, they glom
onto a case called, I think, In Re Gibson Group, where the
court uses, amongst other phrases, “cost benefit analysis,” 
and the diocese says there's been no cost benefit analysis. 
And if what they're saying is you have to have testimony as to
what the committee's fees would be and what the ability --
what the assets are worth that you're pursuing and your
likelihood of success on that, the cases don't recite in their
facts that that kind of presentation was made to the court. 
In fact, in the STN (ph) Enterprises case, which is one of the
Second Circuit cases, the court said that can be determined by
evidentiary hearing or otherwise.  
But let's get back to what the standard is. 
Frankly, the language is all over the place.  If you look at
the Curry decision, it talks -- it's the one that uses, by the
way, the abuse of discretion -- debtor's discretion, it talks
about whether the initiation of the action would move the
reorganization forward or whether it would be a detriment. 
That's how they phrase is.  The Monsieur (ph) Medical case
talks about the best interests of the estate in proceeding
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with the litigation.  STN talks about whether the action is
likely to benefit the reorganization.  The Le World (ph) case,
it actually just uses the word whether there's a colorable
claim.  Gibson itself, cost benefit analysis, whether pursuing
the claim would benefit the estate, and said on the face of
the complaint, the face of the complaint, “Canadian Pacific,”
which is the creditor that was pursuing standing, “has stated
a colorable claim under 11 USC 547 or 548 that would benefit
the estate if successful.”  Adelphia, best interest of the
estate, necessary and beneficial.  
 I mean, the bottom line is I don't think there are
magic words that are going to be the key to this lock.  You
have to come away with the feeling that bringing this
litigation would be a good thing for this case, be it to move
it towards a consensual plan or to recover assets for the
benefit of creditors, given what's at stake.  
So what's at stake?  You have $3 million in assets
that the debtor moved to the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska
within the year prior to the filing.  There is dispute that
might go to whether there's a colorable claim, but that's
what's at stake there, $3 million.  And then you have the
parish properties -- that's a fraudulent conveyance theory,
and then you have the parish properties, which is a
combination--and we'll get to this shortly--on whether there's
a fraudulent conveyance by virtue of the recordation of those
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notices of beneficial interest, and then depending on the
impact of using 544 on those notices, whether -- I'm sorry,
548 and Alaska law through 544, once they're -- once they've
been avoided, what is the ability then to use 544(a)(3)?  
The parish properties are probably just of obvious 
value.  There's been talk by Mr. Elsaesser from time to time
about the bush properties, but there has been almost an --
really acknowledgment, not almost.  There's been an
acknowledgment that what people refer to as the
self-sustaining parishes, and there are eight of them,
have potentially -- have real value.  And I started to stay
potentially because one doesn't know until you actually try to
market them or refinance them, but if you just look at the
debtor's website of the pictures of these properties--and I
have pictures with me--these are substantial buildings on
substantial pieces of property.  
The bank statements that Mr. Elsaesser has given me
since, I think, May of last year for these self-sustaining
parishes show no debt service, they're not encumbered
properties.  And so between the Catholic Trust of Northern
Alaska and the properties themselves, which have been, I
think, acknowledged to be of value, subject to RFRA, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and historical status and
what the best use of the property would be, but they have
value.
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Litigation is not going to cost $3 million. 
Ms. Boswell trots out the various expenses of the
administration in the cases where these matters were
contested, but those are bills for, at least, I think, in the
case of San Diego, she gave you the entire cost of
administration for the entire case, which had a lot of other
issues going on.  In Spokane it included two committees, there
were extraordinary costs because of that structure, and so --
and in Portland, which had a lot of issues going on, including
the fact that they had a defendant class action going on in
the context of the property litigation, and we're certainly
not intending to try to certify a defendant class in the
property litigation that we would bring.  We didn't do it in
Spokane, and we wouldn’t repeat that here.  
So in summary, Your Honor, I go back to
Judge Gerber's opinion in Adelphia where he says, “The
practice of authorizing the prosecution of actions on behalf
of an estate by committees and even by individual creditors
upon a showing that such is in the interest of the state is
one of long standing and nearly universally recognized.”  And
in his footnote, he cites the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit BAP, the Ninth Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit BAP, and notes that only the Tenth Circuit
BAP, which is the Fox (ph) decision cited by the debtor, the
only appellate decision as of 2005 that had failed to
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recognize this Court's authority to allow this committee the
standing.  
The second issue the committee -- I'm sorry, that
our focus is on is whether there are colorable claims.  And
I'd like to just be really clear about what this motion does
and what this motion doesn't do.  This motion does not seek
authority to sue the parishes and possibly the diocese in a
declaratory relief action as to whether the parishes are
separate entities under Alaska law.  It was clear from the
Spokane decision, both at trial and on appeal before
Judge Quackenbush, that that authority was not necessary.  He
said, Judge Quackenbush did, that maybe we should’ve asked,
but he found that it wasn't jurisdictionally necessary.  
And we have been, very surprising to me, almost
faulted by the debtor for not bringing this debt relief action
on the parish status earlier.  A debtor that almost without
fail at every hearing--and if you include the briefs, this
hearing as well--says we do not have enough money to repeat
the performances in some of the other cases, we're a poor
diocese, we don't have the money to pay the admin expenses,
and now we are faulted for having tried to give mediation a
chance on two occasions for not having pulled the trigger on
the property litigation. 
Now, early in the case I asked you for, in -- maybe
in the context of a status hearing, we talked about the
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property litigation as far as the parishes are concerned.  You
said to me do not do anything until November 14th.  I believe
that was the date.  That allowed the first mediation session
to occur with Judge Bentonelli (ph).  That didn't work out,
and about a month later we started the demands upon the
debtor.  But, you know, to come in and say, “We never had the
money to do the litigation that may be necessary in this case,
so compromise, compromise,” and then fault the committee for
having given compromise a chance just seems to me to be just
too inconsistent.  
But I should point out that in terms of -- again,
this is not an avoidance-action-standing issue, but I should
point out that at least the Seventh Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit and Judge Perris in Portland have all said that under
applicable civil law, the parishes are not separately --
separate civil entities.  And we'll have -- and Mr. Elsaesser
and I went through this in Spokane, we may go through it
again, but the standing action -- standing motion is related
to it in the sense that they attempt to deal with the
property-of-the-estate issue, but it's not really part of the
standing motion in and of itself.  
So do we have colorable claims?  The -- there are
various kinds of trusts that we talked about.  I'm not going
to go through in detail in each one, but the one that caused
us the most indigestion in Spokane was the resulting trust
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issue.  Judge Quackenbush remanded the case, having found that
on summary judgment there was evidence that either the
parishes or parishioners had a resulting trust interest in the
properties and that had to go to trial.  But he -- at least at
the bankruptcy court level, Judge Williams found that if we
had the 544(a)(3) powers, that we would defeat the resulting
trust.  Judge Quackenbush said, well, I'm not sure you would
because if you went to the church, you would see that someone
occupies the property.  And that would put you on inquiry
notice to ask why those people are there.  It was two
sentences in his opinion, and it's an “of course” kind of
conclusion by him.  
We have gone through in our brief and pointed out
the elements of inquiry notice as to an occupant under Alaska
law, and Judge -- I'm sorry, Judge Perris, in her opinion,
addressed that as well in much, much more detail than Judge
Quackenbush did, and with due respect to him, she did a better
job.  I mean, she actually analyzed the issue and concluded,
in kind of my shorthand summary, that if you went to a
parish -- to a high -- Catholic high school or you went to a
parish and you saw people there doing things that people do at
such a religious building or educational building, that
wouldn’t cause you to think that there's a problem with the
title.  Having a priest at a parish and seeing the title in
The Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska would not put you on
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inquiry notice.  And she goes into some other detail about
that, but that's essentially what she said.  And I think that
it's almost so obvious that one would have to conclude that
that's true.
The debtor's response to statutory trusts, be it in
the corporation's sole statute or the articles of
incorporation, really go to reading canon law into the
statute -- or into the articles.  And Judge Perris talks about
that at length in her opinions and says, look, you can use
canon law in your operations and you can conduct each -- your
relationship with -- be it internal to the diocese for canon
law and your articles can provide for that, and you can do it
as between the parishes, but your canon law doesn't control
how those relationship are ascertained -- are characterized
by, in her case, Oregon law.  And that's got to be the law. 
No one can seriously say with a straight face that your
decisions as to the rights of third-party creditors are
determined not by the law of Alaska but by the canon laws of
the Catholic Church.  It just is so beyond imagination.  
Now, Judge Williams asked Mr. Cross about that in
the context of her authority to order the sale of property,
and he said, well, above a certain dollar amount we'd have to
get permission from the Holy See.  And she said, well, what if
you don't, and he said, well, that would be a violation of our
First Amendment rights and we wouldn’t have to follow your
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order, and she leaned back and said what are you doing in my
courtroom.  And so it just can't be the case, and that's they
keep on doing.  
Now, they looked to the amended articles in 2007 as,
aha, well, you know, maybe the language was a little unclear
in the older documents, which really track the Oregon statute
and the Archdiocese of Portland's documents, but in 2007 we
fixed it, and it clearly says trust, it clearly expresses the
intent.  And it is certainly the committee's position that to
the extent those articles are documents that reflect a
conveyance of property, that they are fraudulent transfers,
that the articles themselves would constitute a fraudulent
transfer.  Now, the dioceses know it just memorializes the
relationships that existed before.  Well, the old articles, as
at least interpreted in analogous situations by Judge
Williams, says you can't bring in canon law to somehow then
cause the result under Oregon law that canon law controls with
all the attendant claims of trust relationships.  
As to the notices of beneficial interest, the debtor
says those weren't transfers of property, and so because they
weren't transfers of property, you can't avoid them.  Well, I
go back and look at 548(d)(1), which defines transfer in a
fraudulent conveyance context, and as I read the statute, it
says that a transfer occurs when the rights of a BFP are cut
off.  And the rights of the BFP -- I mean, this is what the
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debtor relies on.  The rights of the BFP were cut off when
they recorded those notices of beneficial interest.  So it
wasn't when the property was acquired 40, 50 years ago and
this trust relationship somehow instantly connected to the
property or attached to the property when it was granted by
Mr. and Mrs Smith.  The transfer occurred, for 548 purposes,
when something was done to cut off the rights of BFP.  That
happened within the year prior to the bankruptcy when they
recorded notices of beneficial interest.  
As to the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska, I don't
think there's really serious debate about what happened. 
There was money in an account that, as far as we understand,
had the bishop's or the diocese's or the debtor's name on it.
It contained funds that came up from the parishes,
acknowledging for at least these purposes that the parishes
even exist as a separate entity.  There was money from KNOM in
the account, and while the debtor may have been accounting
separately from KNOM, they have never -- they certainly didn't
say in their schedules that KNOM was a separate entity.  It's
part of the diocese.  
The same was true for the schools:  part of the
diocese, separate name, maybe Mr. Vaderik (ph) kept separate
books and records, but they've never contended it wasn't
property of the estate.  In fact, that's what their RFRA
discussion is about vis-a-vis the schools.  It is property of
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the estate, but it doesn't get included for various tests
under a plan confirmation.  
And there were excess reserves, which means that
that account was earning more interest than was payable back
to the depositors.  That was over a million dollars at the
time that they said that they got divorced.  And they said,
okay, we're going to create the Catholic Trust of Northern
Alaska, we're going to keep this reserve money, this excess,
over what we have to pay the depositor and kick it into this
trust account.  I don't think they necessarily kicked out --
or kept the KNOM money.  I think there's some testimony that
that may have been transferred back over after the fact.  
But it's clear that these monies were commingled,
that they -- I think Bishop Kettler testified in his first-day
declaration the monies have come to CBNA.  And it is certainly
colorable -- we're not conducting -- this is not a summary
judgment hearing, but it's certainly colorable that that was
essentially a debtor-creditor relationship, and while
Ms. Boswell may take exception to our characterization of it
as a bank because Mr. Bowder testifies there were never any
loans.  The fact of the matter is people had a contractual
claim, evidenced by probably a myriad of different procedure
manuals and the like, to get their money back.  But the fact
that they could separately account for it does not mean that
there's not a colorable claim that that money was transferred
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out of the estate when it was given to the Catholic Trust of
Northern Alaska.  
Almost done, Your Honor.
Ms. Boswell also says that even if we can avoid
these notices of beneficial interest, that they're not void,
that there's a difference.  And because they're not void as of
the petition date, they still give notice, and, therefore, you
don't have a 544(a)(3) argument.  Well -- and she points to
Section 550, saying that tells you what avoidance means, and
what it -- we all know it enables you to get something back
from the transferee.  Well, the title of Section 550, if you
want to use the title of a statute for some help in
understanding what's going on, is liability of a transferee. 
It is not meant to be a definition of what avoidance means in
all of its contexts.  It certainly tells you what avoidance
means if you're chasing a transferee to recover property or to
get money back from the transferee, but it doesn't define what
avoidance means. 
And there are at least two Ninth Circuit decisions
which, in referring to Section 548, say that it voids the
transfer.  And this “a” becoming very important between void
and avoid.  And In Re Preblic (ph), at 46 F.3d 1144, says
548(a)(2) gives the trustee the power to void fraudulent
transfers, and In Re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, which was the case
talking about whether a properly conducted foreclosure sale
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could be a fraudulent conveyance, said, “It has been widely
recognized allowing a bankruptcy court to undo a foreclosure
sale,” interpreting what the 548 application to foreclosure
sale would mean, “carries with it...” and then it goes on to
say something that's not (indiscernible) relevant.  So
avoiding a transaction under 548, we believe, voids it, voids
it as of the petition date, and then you roll into the 544
powers.  
Your Honor, the debtor talks about the St. Paul
Church case and says that that case recognizes that the canon
law trust principles are somehow imbued in the
corporation-sole statute, and maybe if it were a different
religion, it wouldn’t be the canon law, but it would be their
law, their religious law.  Sometimes you have to -- when you
read these cases on property disputes, you really have to
remember who the parties are.  And in the St. Paul Church
case, which is an Alaska Supreme Court case, it was a local
Methodist church and its governing Methodist organization.
So in that case, using neutral principles of law,
the court looked at the various documents between the parties,
read them from a neutral-principles perspective, and said, and
I can't remember which one won, but “You win.”  That's not
this case.  This case is not an inter-church dispute.  And so
when you look at the documents that define the relationship,
you have to look at the documents not as an inter-church
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dispute where essentially the parties have agreed that those
rules will govern their relationship, no matter how they're
read--deference to superior authority, deference to the
subordinate authority--you use neutral principles to interpret
them.  That's what the Alaska Supreme Court has said.  And
when you're looking at which documents to look at, you don't
look at the documents that no one really has access to, which
are -- and no one really thinks about when they're dealing
with the debtor.  
Finally, Your Honor, the committee's request to
pursue the debtor's claims against the Holy See.  When I first
started this work about five years ago, people would say,
laypeople, can you sue the Vatican?  And I'd go, why, I can't
sue the Vatican, come on, you know?  They're halfway around
the world, everyone knows that, you know -- at least, legal
(indiscernible) knows they're separate country.  And it took a
long time between the efforts of some lawyers in Kentucky and
lawyers litigating in the Ninth Circuit to establish that,
yeah, you -- sometimes you can sue the Vatican and sometimes
you can sue the Holy See.  And the Ninth Circuit has ruled
that there are circumstances under which there could be
personal jurisdiction over the Holy See, notwithstanding the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  
And so the specter of another six years of labor in
the Ninth Circuit to see if you can get jurisdiction over the
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Holy See isn't going to be repeated.  That work has already
been done by an attorney named Jeff Anderson.  We -- the
debtor, although it does reserve its -- all of its objections,
does not say that this trial manual, this Crimin (ph) -- I'm
going to mispronounce the name, but it's the document that we
attached to the exhibit, does not say that that's not a
document that the Vatican issued.  It -- that's an issue -- I
guess, an issue of fact.  Whether it came to Bishop Kettler's
predecessors may be an issue of fact.  But at least we've now
had two circuit courts of appeal say there are circumstances
in the context of sexual abuse claims where there can be
jurisdiction over the Holy See.  
And, again, we are not asserting the claims of
sexual abuse victims.  That's not what we're trying to do.  We
don't need to come to you probably for permission to do that. 
We would go to them for permission to do that.  We are looking
to assert the rights of the diocese, which entitled to have
its assets protected by the Holy See, because under the
canons, the Pope is the -- I believe the phrase is “supreme
ordinary and administrator” -- I may not have this --
“administrator of all ecclesiastical property anywhere in the
world,” and all property of the church, be it a diocese or
parish, is ecclesiastical property.  
So that's the theory.  We don't think we're climbing
up the same mountain, and we think that the standing as to
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that litigation is warranted as well.  Thank you, Your Honor. 
I appreciate the time you gave me.  
THE COURT:  You're welcome.  Ms. Boswell?  
MS. BOSWELL:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
(Pause) 
THE CLERK:  Could you adjust the mic?  Thank you. 
MS. BOSWELL:  Yes.  
(Laughter)
MS. BOSWELL:  Mr. Stang and I don't exactly use the
same height of mic.  I've been hoping that it hasn't happened.
Thank you, Your Honor.  Let me address the authority
issue because I think that the question of what are the claims
and whether or not assuming that authority could be granted
that they should be pursued is something that I will get to in
a moment.  
Obviously, Mr. Stang and I, the committee, and the
debtor have significant disagreement in terms of what the law
is in this circuit about the ability to pursue those claims
over the objection or the ability of the Court, if you will,
to grant authority to pursue those claims over the objection
of the debtor.  And we have the Sparetos (ph) and the Car
America cases, and then we have the Spaulding case, we have --
which, as Mr. Stang acknowledges, was one where the debtor or
debtor in possession in that case stipulated and agreed that
the committee should be granted the authority to pursue those
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claims.  That, in fact, was the situation in Parmatex (ph) as
well.  The debtor in that case, in fact, agreed.  
So the question becomes not what a judge did,
Judge Gerber, in the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District
of New York, in the Adelphia case, but, more importantly, what
is the law in this circuit.  And, Your Honor, we submit that
the law in this circuit is that under Sparetos (ph), and as
confirmed, albeit not with a lot of comment, and I will
certainly be the first to admit it, in Car America that the
authority to pursue avoidance actions cannot be granted to
a -- derivative standing cannot be given to a creditor or a
committee over the objections of the debtor in possession.
that does not mean there are not remedies, and the remedies
are, as we recognize, you know, potentially drastic.  But that
does not change the fact that the Ninth Circuit in the
Sparetos case determined that a creditor could not proceed and
could not obtain those rights over the objections of, in that
case, the trustee, and with a one-line comment, in the Car
America case, said the same, Your Honor.  And we believe that
is the law in this circuit.  
But even if the Court were to find that Sparetos and
Car America don't really mean what they say, and for some
reason it would be distinguishable from what is before the
Court today, then, Your Honor, you do have to look to the
test.  It's a test that Your Honor certainly is familiar with
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because, as Mr. Stang said, in either case, you articulated
it.  
The one that is mostly commonly looked at and which
this Court clearly applied, even though you didn’t articulate
it as such, is not only whether there are colorable claims
that benefit the estate.  The way you determine that is to
look at the cost benefit analysis, and I know that the
committee tries to gloss over the cost by saying that somehow
or other, by allowing them to bring the avoidance actions,
it’s different than the declaratory judgment over what is
property of the estate, and therefore what you are dealing
with is something much more simple to be able to determine, so
from a cost benefit analysis, presumably the debt that is the
same but the cost is much less.  Well, we don’t know that, and
we don’t that because what has been presented to you is simply
allegations with no background and no facts other than the
bare facts that were in the motion, the facts that we’ve now
brought forth, and clearly with no cost.  There is -- 
And, Your Honor, you have not seen a fee application
in this case except from the Dorsey & Whitney firm, and
there’s a reason for that, and the reason for that is because,
until something is done in terms of mortgaging property or
selling some property, they’re not liquid assets with which to
be paying administrative costs right now, so it’s not an
administratively insolvent estate, it’s a cash-strapped
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estate, so from that perspective, the Court is somewhat in the
dark as to what the administrative costs have been.  I will
say that until recently I think the parties have tried to keep
the administrative costs down.  Unfortunately, for a variety
of reasons, things have escalated to a point where there is
more litigation, and I view this and the debtor views this as
really a threshold issue in terms of the direction that this
case can take and will take. 
The one thing that Mr. Stang said and the committee
said in its motion was that for all intents and purposes this
was a way to get leverage.  I don’t think you can take it as
any other way of saying that, that this is a way to get
leverage, and, Your Honor, that isn’t what any of the tests
are.  Giving another party leverage is not the basis upon
which to grant the ability to bring the type of litigation
that the committee wants to commence, and so what we have is
we have our position that under Ninth Circuit law they can’t
be assigned.  Then you have, if they can, then clearly there
has to be a cost benefit analysis, and that is not the
debtor’s obligation to provide the Court with the cost benefit
analysis.  That is the moving party’s. 
But I want to talk about what it is that the
committee seeks to do and talk a little bit about the
realities of that which they seek to go after under the 544
powers, and to date, we don’t know what that complaint would
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look like because we have -- that hasn’t been prepared.  We
don’t know whether in the context of that action the committee
will indeed seek to determine what is and is not property of
the estate, and, quite frankly, Your Honor, I don’t know how
you can make a determination as to whether or not parish
properties, CTNA, the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska, is or
is -- can or cannot be avoided without also determining
whether it’s property of the estate.  
Now, Mr. Stang may have in his head the way to do
that.  If he has, he hasn’t shared it.  He hasn’t shared it
with the Court, he hasn’t shared it with us, and one can only
presume what that litigation would look like, but they’ve had
a significant amount of time to be far more specific in terms
of what it is they would be doing, what discovery they think
would be necessary, what they already have that they wouldn’t
need to do any further discovery on and how they think the
case would proceed and what it might cost.  That hasn’t been
done.  And, by the way, Your Honor, I will address the motion
to strike at the end.  I’ve decided that I’d go in reverse
order.  
Your Honor, the actions that the committee seeks to
bring also would not be, in my view, the end of the litigation
because while there was discussion at the end of the motion
about RFRA and trusts, et cetera, it was kind of like a
throwaway, and one of the things that is not included in this
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litigation, and properly so, I might add, Your Honor, are some
of the trust issues that the committee has argued in other
contexts, so what we’re talking about are -- is parish
property, the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska and the claims
against the Holy See. 
With respect to parish properties, Your Honor, it
would appear that Mr. Stang is conceding that out of the
48 parishes, the 36 non self-sustaining parishes that are
located in the bush are probably not worth much, so I guess I
don’t know whether that means that they would include them,
they wouldn’t include them, but I think we can all assume that
from the cost benefit analysis that these properties there
isn’t going to be great value to.  
Mr. Stang says but we have these other properties
and these other properties consist of these eight
self-sustaining parishes.  Well, what Mr. Stang doesn’t tell
you is that out of those eight self-sustaining parishes,
four of those, Your Honor, are basically in locations where
they are the single church in those locations.  One is in
Barrow, one is in Bethel, one is in Delta Junction, and one is
in North Pole.  That leaves four in Fairbanks.  Of those four,
as we indicated in our moving papers, the Immaculate
Conception church is a historic designated church, so its use
would be significantly restricted.  
Mr. Stang does seem to recognize that even if the
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Court were to determine that the committee should pursue the
avoidance actions and even if the Court were to determine that
under 544 that, notwithstanding all the evidence to the
contrary, that the -- a BFP would prevail against the parishes
and against CBNA with respect to those properties, there still
has not been any indication of what, if anything, those
properties could sell for or what, if any, value those
properties would bring into this estate presumably for, as
Mr. Stang puts it, the benefit of all creditors.  That is a
huge gap, that is a huge gap, because this is going to be a
fact-intensive inquiry, Your Honor, as to all of the issues
that the committee wants to pursue.  
With respect to the legal issue, let alone the
factual issue, there is a basic issue that the Court is going
to have to determine if the Court gives the committee the
authority to pursue these actions, and that issue, Your Honor,
is whether or not, going back to 1952, under the Alaska
Religious Corporation Act and the articles of this entity,
Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, there has been a trust
relationship that has existed from that period of time. 
That’s number 1.  
Number 2, whether or not the 2007 amendment, which
clarified -- it wasn’t new -- clarified the prior articles was
indeed a transfer, and notwithstanding what Mr. Stang would
read into 544 or 548, the statute still talks about a
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transfer, so, you know, it isn’t that a BFP just comes in and
says “I like that, and I want to take that,” there is a
necessary step, and that is, in order for there to be an
avoidance, there has to have been a transfer, so the question
becomes did the amendment of the articles constitute a
transfer.  We say it didn’t.  They say it did.  That’s another
issue the Court’s going to have to determine.  
The other issue, Your Honor, is whether the
recording of notices of beneficial interest -- that’s all they
were, and you have a copy -- recording of notices of
beneficial interest constituted a transfer.  Again, Your
Honor, that’s a determination that this Court is going to have
to make as a threshold issue, and a necessary precedent or
first step is to determine whether or not a transfer occurred
because if no transfer occurred, Your Honor, there is nothing
to avoid.  
So this is not a simple matter of the committee
getting the avoidance actions and then commencing an action
and then we all start producing documents and then come in
with respect to ownership issues, Your Honor.  There are some
basic issues here that are going to need to be determined.  
The other thing, Your Honor, is Mr. Stang,
for obvious reasons, really likes to brush over Judge
Quackenbush’s opinion, which is the only appellate decision in
this circuit on this issue, and talk about what Judge Williams
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did, whose opinion was vacated, and talk about what Judge
Perris did, whose opinion is a bankruptcy court opinion that
was up on appeal but the case settled.  And what Judge
Quackenbush said was that each of these entities, each of
these parishes, are individually fact-intensive inquiries that
have to be determined prior to any determination of who owns
the property and whether or not those interests can be
avoided.  
Whether it’s under a 544 theory or a resulting trust
theory, the 544 BFP powers is not a silver bullet.  It does
not take away the defenses that the parishes have or that CBNA
has to these claims no matter what decision there is, and, in
fact, even in Judge Perris’s decision, she said, after she
rendered her decision, that as to the parishes before her, and
these were not all of the parishes -- I believe it was eight
or 12, I don’t remember; they picked the parishes -- she said
that before any could be sold of those that they had picked,
she would have to go through a RFRA analysis to determine
whether or not those properties could be available for
creditors or whether to do so would be a severe impact or a
burden on the free exercise of religion.  
So, again, what we are talking about here is
complex, lengthy litigation, and you asked what happened in
the other cases, Your Honor, and I think that Mr. Stang was
correct.  In Portland, the debtor ceded the powers on the
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first day, and that -- we cited the order to you where Judge
Perris referred to that.  In Spokane, as Mr. Stang said, he
asked three times and he didn’t get it.  In Tucson, the issue
didn’t come up, we settled it.  In Davenport, the issue did
not come up, and in San Diego, Your Honor, it wasn’t that
Mr. Stang necessarily asked for them, it was that Judge Adler
(ph) asked him to bring the action, the motion, and she’s the
one who designated the parishes against whom the actions would
be brought, and I would say, Your Honor, that I think that
San Diego was an anomaly to the other cases, and I think
Mr. Stang would frankly agree with me.  
With respect to the Catholic Trust of Northern
Alaska, Your Honor, there was a declaration from Mr. Bowder
and we have offered to provide information to the committee,
and I think the committee may even have some documents to
this effect.  It was not a commingled trust, it was not a
commingled account.  It has been and was always a custodial
account that was so segregated, designated and invested by the
diocese, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, before CTNA was
created.  With respect to that, there was separate accounting. 
The investments were pooled, but that does not make them lose
their character, nor were they commingled, if you will, or
pooled with investments of CBNA other than some investments of
KNOM and the Catholic schools, and we’ve disclosed that, we’ve
accounted for it, and, Your Honor, we’ve indicated what that
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It’s interesting that Mr. Bowder was asked, and I
think it was at the first meeting of creditors, by Mr. Manley,
“Do you have a single piece of paper that shows that there was
any kind of agreement between CBNA and the parishes?” and, in
fact, Mr. Bowder said, yes, he did.  Your Honor, CTNA was the
successor to a trust that existed prior to the time that CTNA
was set up.  
In addition, Your Honor, even if -- even if -- the
Court were to determine that somehow or other it was a
transfer that can and should be avoided, the inquiry does not
stop there.  The parishes, like CTNA, raise money for specific
purposes.  A part of that money, and a significant part of
that money, constituted restricted funds that had been raised
by the parishes for specific purposes so designated by the
donors.  So when all is said and done, it may very well be
that even if this could be avoided, the net benefit to the
estate will be a negative by the time you add in the amount of
money that the committee has spent in litigating this issue.
And, Your Honor, the -- it is not a situation where
the diocese money was taken and it was transferred to the
parishes on the eve of filing, and we are confident, Your
Honor, that if this matter goes forward that there will not be
a finding that there was any type of fraudulent transfer,
which is the only theory here.  There is no BFP theory here. 
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It’s either a fraudulent transfer or it’s not a fraudulent
transfer, so unlike the parish property, where Mr. Stang needs
the 544 powers, he thinks, in order to prevail as somehow a
magic bullet, that would not be the case with CTNA.  
Your Honor, with respect to whether or not the
parishes will participate in the plan, I think Mr. Stang is
jumping to some conclusions that he should not jump to.  The
plan does provide for participating third parties, and we
believe that, in fact, there will be some participating third
parties that will be brought before the Court as a settlement,
and hopefully with the concurrence of the committee, but I do
not know at this point whether that would be the case.  
Your Honor, I think the other thing that the Court
has to look to with respect to determining the property rights
here is, in fact, the religious corporation sole statute and
also the canons of the Catholic church.  Mr. Stang at least
acknowledges the St. Paul Church case, and he tries to argue
that -- and this is the Alaska Supreme Court case -- and it
was a dispute between the local church and the Methodist --
the United Methodist Church regarding church ownership -- I
mean, property ownership, but, Your Honor, it was the same
situation where in that case the property was to be held in
trust for its parent, and the dispute was whether or not the
members who wanted to split off and form a different church
had the right to take that property, the contention being that
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since the deed did not reflect the trust relationship between
the local church and the United Methodist Church, although it
was required to, and although the canon -- I’m sorry -- both
under the canons of that religious entity and also under the
Alaska religious corporation sole statute, the Court correctly
looked at the Supreme Court decisions, and in particularly
Jones v. Wolf, and Jones v. Wolf is very often cited for
neutral principles, and then the next sentence goes on to say
neutral principles means that you disregard in total any of
the internal documents or canons or constitution of the
religious entity and you apply only civil principles.  That is
not what Jones v. Wolf says, Your Honor, and, in fact, Jones
v. Wolf says neutral principles and also considering the
statutes, the canons, the constitution of those religious
entities.  It also stands for the principle that certainly the
courts cannot involve themselves in intra-church disputes.  
Your Honor, I think that the St. Paul v. Board of
Trustees Alaska Supreme Court case is controlling here in
terms of determination of the property interests and is
another issue that the Court will have to consider if it
allows the committee to go forward. 
Finally, Your Honor, let me talk about the Holy See
claims.  I believe the most telling part of the motion is
that -- and this is on page 20 -- it says, “The committee
believes that such a complaint is appropriate as compared to
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the plaintiffs in the state court actions in ending their
complaint so as to avoid a defense by the Holy See that it is
protected by the statute of limitations.”  Your Honor, estate
assets absolutely should not be used and should not be allowed
to be used to pursue a claim against the Holy See that could
have been brought by the individual claimants had they chosen
to do so starting back in 2000 when -- or 2002 when they
started filing claims against the Catholic Bishop of Northern
Alaska.  In neither of the Ninth Circuit case, the California
case, nor in the Kentucky case was there an attempt to force a
diocese to bring that claim, and, in fact, what it was in both
those cases -- well, at least, in the Kentucky case -- is a
class action.  
Your Honor, Mr. Stang would have the Court believe
that because of the rulings in the Ninth Circuit and in the
Sixth Circuit, now the way has been paved and there will be no
further impediments to a suit against the Holy See, and you
won’t see another six years going up through various motions
and appellate decisions, et cetera.  Your Honor, you may not
see another six years, you may see another 12 years.  The
Sixth Circuit case is now before the Supreme Court on a
petition for writ of certiori.  The Ninth Circuit case, I
believe, is still awaiting whether or not it will be granted
en banc review.  
In addition, Your Honor, in the Sixth Circuit case
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and in the Ninth Circuit case, you have never gotten beyond,
in all these years, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction,
and I feel pretty confident that if a claim is brought in a
bankruptcy case, chapter 11 case, as a derivative claim on
behalf of a diocese, that there will be its own set of unique
issues that will wend themselves through the courts for many,
many, many years.  
In addition, Your Honor, as the Ninth Circuit said
in that decision, they chided the attorney for the Holy See
for bifurcating his motions and not bringing a 12(b)(6) motion
at the same time that he brought the motion to dismiss on the
basis of subject matter jurisdiction and made it very clear
that their ruling did not rule on the validity of the claims. 
The only thing they ruled on is that there was not a per se
immunity for all claims against the Holy See.  
It also, Your Honor, brings up a whole other set of
issues because if these priests and if the diocese or this
bishop was an employee of the Holy See, then perhaps, Your
Honor, there are no claims against CBNA.  Furthermore, Your
Honor, Mr. Stang says, well, what we want to do is we don’t
want to assert the rights of the state court claimants.  We
understand why, because they think they have statute of
limitations issues.  What we want to do is we want to use
these estate assets, and we want to assert these claims on
behalf of CBNA against the Holy See, and, Your Honor, in order
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to do that, we are going to have to, of course, deal with the
issue of canon law.  Well, Your Honor, I suggest to you that
when you get into the relationship between the diocese, the
bishop and the Holy See as opposed to a third-party claimant
suing on a tort theory, that you’re going to have a very, very
different litigation than what has already been before the
courts.  
In addition, Your Honor, Mr. Stang -- the thing that
forms the linchpin for this litigation is the premium and the
directive or the asserted directive of the Holy See with
respect to what a diocese or a bishop or a priest should or
should not do with respect to allegations of childhood sexual
abuse, and, Your Honor, in that situation, one of the key
issues is whether or not that document ever went out to any of
the bishops or any of the priests, because, if it didn’t, then
it would seem to me that the whole linchpin of their
allegations and of their claim is significantly flawed. 
Finally, Your Honor, with respect to that, Mr. Stang
says, well, what we want to do is we want to bring these
claims on behalf of the diocese because they owed a duty to
the diocese which was breached -- the Holy See owed a duty to
the diocese which was breached, and as a result of that,
terrible things happened, and we understand -- we agree these
were terrible things -- and as a result of that, because of
these terrible things, then the Holy See is liable to this
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That sounds an awful lot like a contribution or
indemnification claim to me, and, Your Honor, this is exactly
the same kind of claim that Mr. Stang in pleadings in the
Jesuit case has said does not apply in Alaska as his
justification for why Pachulski Stang could represent the
committee in the Jesuit case against whom the diocese believes
it has significant claims, given the fact that all of the
priests and all of the bishops until Bishop Kettler were, in
fact, Jesuits, and now he’s standing before you and saying but
let me use estate assets to chase this lawsuit on what sounds
to me like would be very much the same claim that I’m already
on record saying does not apply in Alaska.  
Your Honor, for all of these reasons, we would ask
that the Court deny the committee standing to bring these
actions.  
Let me address very quickly the motion to strike. 
Your Honor, I am only mildly amused that Mr. Stang would say
that I didn’t call him and tell him that they should have
filed their motion, and that’s kind of indicative of the way
the case was going.  In fact, when I filed the motion for
order to show cause, I called Mr. Stang, and I asked him for
more time to respond to the avoidance action motion because we
had filed this OSC and because we believed that it was
appropriate to have the Court rule on the OSC before we
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proceeded even though the committee was not part of the OSC
except insofar as what was in the motion.  I was told that I
could have 48 hours, and then, if the Court will recall, we
were before you because you entered the OSC and the committee
asked for expedited relief in order to require us to file our
response because it was important to get the litigation going,
to get this matter determined, so for Mr. Stang to now stand
before you and say, well, don’t fault us because we really
wanted to give the mediation a chance, I think is just belied
by the record.  
Your Honor, I’m not going to spend time on this.  I
think the rules are the rules, and that’s why we brought this
motion, and, Your Honor, we just stand on our pleadings with
respect to that.  
THE COURT:  Thank you very much.  Okay, Mr. Stang,
rebuttal? 
MR. STANG:  Briefly, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  You bet.  
MR. STANG:  Ms. Boswell and I can agree on
something.  Quote, “basic issues -- these are basic issues
that need to be determined.”  These are basic -- she’s right,
they are, and you can have the longest confirmation hearing
probably known to a bankruptcy court in recent history to have
all these issues resolved because they’re going to get
addressed, or we can do it in a different fashion, have them
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addressed first and see if the resolution of those issues can
lead to a consensual plan, and, as I said before, Mr. Orgel
has more to say about that.  
The Corey versus Sorenson case talks about -- and I
quoted it -- the things that can be done when there’s a
nonconsensual motion for standing, and at headnotes 4 and 5,
the Court says you can bring a motion to dismiss; you can
bring a motion to convert, not possible in this case; you can
bring a motion for the appointment of a trustee, probably
pretty unlikely given what you’ve been hearing about RFRA, and
having a trustee actually administer these churches and
schools; or you can get the -- move to compel the debtor to do
it, not really very satisfying since they’d be reluctant; or
the committee can ask, and so there are alternatives.  None of
them would particularly work well except for the one that
we’ve proposed. 
In Corey, the courts, in articulating the standard
about whether you should give the community standard, said
would the initiation of the action move the reorganization
forward or would it be a detriment.  Now, maybe that’s
Ms. Boswell’s word for leverage.  From our perspective it’s to
get these issues resolved.  But she said something very
telling.  After Judge Perris ruled in Portland, the case
settled.  You know, when there’s risk to people -- and there’s
no risk to them now on these issues -- when there’s risk to
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people, they reevaluate their positions and maybe the case can
be resolved consensually.  This is the only case in all of the
diocese cases, and Jesuits were early, that has gotten to this
point, and I know the insurance litigation may help resolve
some things, but this property issue needs to get resolved,
and I suspect upon resolution, whoever is going to win it,
even at the trial level, this case will make a big step
forward.  
Well, we reached a settlement in Spokane with the
debtor after Judge Williams’ trial court decision.  Now, she
didn’t approve that settlement because it was not in the
context of a plan though it was subject to plan confirmation,
but that case moved forward, and when Judge Quack -- so it
moved forward, frankly, more on our terms than the diocese,
but then when Judge Quackenbush ruled, there was an overall
settlement reached but the other way, so, you know, call it
leverage, you can call it what you want.  The question is does
it move the case forward.  
Ms. Boswell talks a lot about the cost benefit
analysis.  These -- as I said, these issues are fundamental to
their confirmation of their plan.  She’s not -- this estate is
not escaping dealing with whether or not parishes are separate
or not, whether or not these transfers are avoidable, whether
or not the notices of beneficial interest are avoidable.  
I didn’t quite understand the argument about we have
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to establish what is property of the estate in the context of
these parish properties.  Every deed or every deed of any
substantial property says the Catholic Bishop of Northern
Alaska owns these properties, and that was the theory we went
forward on in Spokane.  Because we didn’t have the 544 powers,
we couldn’t deal with the resulting trust argument, and that’s
really why, frankly, the dec relief action hasn’t proceeded. 
We were going to have to deal with the avoidance powers, and
we didn’t have them as early as Ms. Boswell has encouraged to
have filed that litigation.  
We don’t necessarily concede that the bush churches
don’t have value.  I honestly don’t know.  My point was
that -- I think everyone agrees that the Fairbanks properties
do, and the fact that there are four parishes that are somehow
community-centered or the only churches in their particular
town, the parishes in this diocese lease property to where
their churches are, and that was pointed out in the debtor’s
papers.  You don’t necessarily have to own the property to
have a church on it or to conduct your religious services
there, and substantial burden and RFRA issues are something
that Mr. Orgel will get into a little more in the disclosure
statement context, but, you know, the Ninth Circuit has been
clear that you’re not necessarily guaranteed the place to
worship where you -- that you’ve identified as the one that
you want.  
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The -- but Judge Quackenbush did say that the
resulting trust trial would be fact-intensive, but we didn’t
have the avoidance powers.  You could almost concede there’s a
resulting trust if you’re comfortable in a summary judgment
context on your 544(a)(3) powers.  You don’t have to get into
whether or not there’s a resulting trust or not.  You concede
there was and then say, look, 544(a)(3) works, so that specter
of I think it was 98 parishes in Spokane just doesn’t exist
here, and, frankly, Judge, if you said to me that you and
Ms. Boswell need to figure out some test cases, that was done
with Judge Adler, regardless of who initiated the desire to
have the litigation done; it was done in Portland; and it can
be done here.  
The new articles of incorporation did not clarify
the former articles.  All you have to do is look at them.  It
says the new -- these articles supersede, not clarify,
supersede all prior versions.  That’s what the articles of
incorporation say.  And Ms. Boswell talks about BF -- the
church (indiscernible) BF powers needs a transfer.  No, they
don’t.  548 needs to avoid transfers.  BFPs or the debtor-in-
possession, the trustee, has the rights and powers of a
debtor-in-possess -- of a bonafide purchaser of real property. 
It also has the power to avoid transfers, but the trustee also
has the rights and powers of a BFP, and that gets you back to
the recording statute and the priority vis-a-vis recorded
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interests versus unrecorded interests. 
On the St. Paul case, Your Honor, application of
neutral principles of law does not mandate the review of every
single piece of paper that exists between the parties.  Now,
in the context of an intra-church dispute, it would be natural
to look at their governance documents, because both parties
essentially agreed to be governed by those documents, but it
doesn’t require that you undo every scrap of paper, and
Mr. Manley asked Mr. Bowder at the 341 -- it’s in the exhibits
to the disclosure statement objection -- do you have a single
nonreligious secular document that establishes this
relation -- these trust relationships, and the answer was one
word -- no.  So they may have religious documents that say it;
they don’t have a single secular document that a civil court
would be looking at when determining the rights of
nonaffiliated third parties vis-a-vis the debtor. 
Your Honor, the discussion regarding the Holy See,
I’d just like to make two points.  I do not believe there are
any rights of contribution or equitable indemnification in
Alaska.  I briefed that issue, I went through it in Portland,
and, you know, it’s not even a matter of eating my words,
there just isn’t.  This is an issue of the duty of the Holy
See to the diocese to protect the diocese’s assets, and it’s
an entirely separate matter as to -- it is a separate entirely
claim for relief.  Now, if Ms. Boswell is right that it’s
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really the same, then you should be able to add the Holy See
under the civil rules to make it another party, if you will,
not an empty chair, and let the parties in that context, let
the diocese in that context point to the Holy See or not point
to the Holy See, but if it were involved, (indiscernible)
would come out, but, you know, it’s not just -- the statute of
limitations doesn’t limit, as far as I understand the rule,
the ability to bring someone in for apportionment of liability
under the Alaska trial rules.  
Is it going to be simple litigation?  No, it will
not be simple litigation.  Is it litigation that should be
brought?  Absolutely.  And the notion that somehow that the
inquiry into the relationship between the Holy See and the
diocese is too overwhelming for the Court, well, you’re going
to be asked over the next several weeks or months to get to
exactly that kind of understanding of relationship vis-a-vis
the diocese and the parishes.  I mean, there are some
different rules, there are some different things you’d have to
look at, but understanding the relationships between at least
these ecclesiastical entities -- we don’t recognize them being
civil entities, but in their world, separate ecclesiastical
entities -- they call them juridic persons -- that’s something
you’re going to have to do, and so this is just taking it, if
you will, to a different level on the organizational chart.  
Thank you, Your Honor.  
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THE COURT:  Thank you.  Why don’t we take a break
for 10 minutes, and then we’ll resume.  All the parties that
are appearing telephonically, we’ll keep you on the line, and
we’ll -- we won’t recall anybody.  Anyway, we’ll take a break
for 10 minutes and resume at about 10:43.  
(Court recessed at 10:31 a.m., until 10:44 a.m.) 
THE COURT:  Motion for authority to commence,
prosecute and settle litigation and the debtor’s motion to
strike will be taken under advisement.  
The next matter before the Court is the disclosure
statement, and, Mr. Orgel, were you going to handle that?  
MR. ORGEL:  Yes, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  Of course, I will allow the
debtor to proceed first with the disclosure statement, so go
right ahead.  
MS. BOSWELL:  Just wondering.  
THE COURT:  No.  
MS. BOSWELL:  Just wondering.  Thank you, Your
Honor.  Your Honor, my partner, Mr. Paige, is on the phone if
we get into insurance-specific questions.  He doesn’t speak
bankruptcy and I don’t speak insurance, so we make a team
here.  
Your Honor, the objections really fall into two
categories even though all of the insurers except Alaska
National either filed joinders or somewhat filed their own
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objections, but they basically fell into the same objections
that Continental had to the disclosure statement, so when I
talk about Continental’s objection, I’m really including all
of the insurers.  It’s just a way of shorthand.  And then we
had the objection from the committee.
Your Honor, I don’t think anybody disputes the fact
that these are all difficult cases and this is, in its own
way, a particularly difficult case just because of the number
of claims and the financial circumstances of CBNA and
certainly the significant issues with the insurers that appear
to be wending their way through litigation as opposed to
resolution, and, Your Honor, the problems are not of this
administration’s making, they’re not of this bishop’s making,
but he is the one who’s here and the one who is responsible
for trying to resolve and solve these very difficult issues. 
That’s why we came into a chapter 11 was the knowledge that at
that time there were over a hundred claims and the likelihood
that there would be significantly more claims and, given the
limited resources of this entity, a way to try to devise a
plan that would, to the extent possible, again, balance the
interests of the tort claimants and those who depend on CBNA
for some pretty basic services, and that’s what we’re talking
about here are some pretty basic both religious and social
services. 
What we tried to do and what we are trying to do in
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the plan is to access the value of all of the assets that are
either not absolutely necessary to the mission or are not
excluded in one way or another and specifically the issue with
respect to the endowment that has been brought up in the
moving papers by the committee.  The alternative, which you’ve
heard, to not being able to confirm a plan in one way or
another could be dismissal, and there is at least some
suggestion in the committee’s papers that perhaps dismissal
wouldn’t be that bad for the claimants, and, Your Honor, I beg
to differ because, if this case is not resolved either through
a litigated confirmed plan of reorganization or resolution, it
will go into free-fall, and the very reason that this entity
entered chapter 11 was to prevent that kind of free-fall.  The
assets are limited.  Even if the committee were to win on
every issue that they contend should be included, the fact
remains there is a limited pot, and it is very limited.  
With that, Your Honor, I want to address the
specific objections, and I did want to put them in the context
of why we’re here and why we are here with the plan that we
have submitted.  
Let me address Continental’s objections first to the
disclosure statement, and I’ve put them into some categories. 
Continental’s first objection seems to be that there’s an
ambiguity about who the avoidance -- I’m sorry, I have that on
the brain -- who the insurance actions would be assigned to if
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they were to be assigned under the plan.  As the Court might
recall, we have provided for an alternative, either the CBNA
continues to pursue the litigation or, if it would not violate
the cooperation clause and if CBNA determines that it should,
it would assign them.  We will clarify as to who those would
be assigned to, and I would hope that that could be a topic of
conversation between Mr. Stang and myself.  While I know that
there may be some disagreement about whether or not they
should be assigned, I would hope we could at least agree on,
if they were assigned, who they would be assigned to.   
The -- Continental also says that we failed to
attach the settlement trust document, the litigation trust
document, we don’t identify the trustee, and we don’t identify
the special arbitrator.  That, again, Your Honor, is a
document that I think -- those documents, I think, can be
presented prior to confirmation, and that is if we get an
approved disclosure statement, certainly, the identity of the
trustee, the identity -- or the selection of the trustee, the
selection of the special arbitrator, the terms of the
settlement trust and the terms of the litigation trust would
be something that I would expect and hope that the committee
would participate in, both selection and what those documents
would look like.  
If, in fact, the Court determines that they need to
be a part of disclosure, then we will provide draft copies
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prior to the time that the disclosure statement would go out. 
I don’t know that from Continental’s point of view or any of
the insurers’ point of view it will make one difference to
them, and I think it is noteworthy that of the insurers who
have objected, the only one who actually is a creditor who
might vote on the plan, might be entitled to vote on the plan
and might not, is Continental, so, like I say, I seriously
doubt that the existence of these documents will make a
difference if Continental can vote how they vote. 
They say that we fail to include examples of
distribution, and they are correct, we don’t.  And the range,
Your Honor, is, as the Court is aware, because of the
contingencies in the plan and certainly the contingencies of
the insurance litigation, wide, and we talked about whether or
not we would include something like that in the disclosure
statement, and, as we tried to work through that, believed
that it might be even more confusing than it would be
illuminating, but certainly we are willing to provide some
examples with respect to what the range of recoveries would
be, depending upon whether there’s insurance recoveries, how
much those would -- might be, a range of those recoveries
without obviously any prejudice to us nor any waiver or
estoppel with respect to those amounts. 
Another objection of Continental was the lack of
insurance company participation in claims determination based
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upon the -- and this was a number of the insurers’ position --
that based upon their position that their insurance contracts
give them the right to participate in the claims
determination.  There may be situations where they are not --
have lost the right to participate.  Mr. Paige can speak more
to that.  Rather than get into that issue now, I have -- we
have no problem simply putting in the plan and in the
disclosure statement that, to the extent that it is determined
that an insurance company has the right to so participate,
they will be allowed to do so.  
They also take issue with the fact that we have
provided in the plan an alternative with respect to the
statute of limitations.  We have provided that the statute of
limitations, which is a defense to these claims, would not be
asserted in -- with respect to any claimants who stayed in the
settlement trust.  However, if it was determined that the
failure or the waiver, if you will, of the statute of
limitations would be a violation of the cooperation clause,
then we would -- that defense would be asserted and would be
something that the special arbitrator would take into account. 
That is not the case in the litigation trust.  The litigation
trust all defense are preserved. 
I’m not sure what Continental’s issue is with this
since it’s an alternative and since this Court, if there is an
objection to the waiver by an insurance company, will make
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that determination as part of confirmation.  I don’t think
this is a disclosure issue.  I think it’s a confirmation issue
and need not be decided now.  
The other objection was that there’s nothing in the
plan and the disclosure statement that basically what the
insurers call insurance neutrality, and that is the
preservation of the insurers’ state law rights.  First of all,
with respect to Continental, notwithstanding the fact that
they attempted to reserve their rights in their proof of
claim, they have filed a proof of claim, and I believe, by
virtue of filing the proof of claim, submitted themselves to
the equitable jurisdiction of this Court, but, regardless,
Your Honor, that is not an issue of disclosure; it is simply
an issue at the time of confirmation whether or not this Court
can affect the state law rights, if any, of the insurers or if
any of those rights are, in fact -- excuse me -- being
affected by virtue of the plan, so, again, since only one of
the insurers may be voting on the plan, I don’t think that the
inclusion of insurance neutrality in the disclosure statement
is a valid disclosure statement objection. 
Finally, Your Honor, Continental does not like the
characterization of at least the CBNA’s view of what led it
into chapter 11 and Continental’s position with respect to
that.  I think everybody understands that a disclosure
statement is the debtor’s position and in no way analysis, but
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if Continental feels strongly about this, I am perfectly happy
to put a sentence in the disclosure statement that says that
Continental disputes the debtor’s position, and that should
take care of that objection.
With respect to the committee, Your Honor, first of
all, there were two areas that were covered by the committee
in their objection that were, frankly, troubling to us.  One
of those, Your Honor, was the whole discussion of the best-
interest-of-creditors test and the absolute-priority rule in
the context of this plan and Ninth Circuit law, and, Your
Honor, what was troubling to us is that there is binding Ninth
Circuit law that the committee did not cite.  They cited the
bankruptcy court decision of the In re General Teamsters,
Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 890, which was the
Northern District of California 1998 case, in passing and for
a separate proposition but did not either as showing having
been affirmed or as citing separately the Ninth Circuit case
that affirmed the bankruptcy court and has some significant
holdings in it with respect to chapter 11 cases and plan
confirmation of nonprofit corporations, and that was a 2001
case that the Pachulski firm actually represented the
plaintiff appellant in that case.  
Your Honor, I think that the Teamsters case, as
we’ve said in our reply to the objections, is, in fact,
controlling and deals with and disposes of, quite frankly,
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many of the committee’s arguments with respect to both
interests -- best interests and the absolute-priority rule to
the extent that there is an implication somehow that the
absolute-priority rule does, in fact, apply to a nonprofit.  I
believe, notwithstanding their failure to bring this case to
the Court’s attention, the fact is that those are confirmation
issues, they are not disclosure issues, as are many of the
objections that the committee has brought. 
The other area, Your Honor, that is troubling with
respect to what the committee’s position is in their objection
is the discussion in the objection with respect to the
dissolution of a nonprofit corporation under Alaska law, and
in that regard, they cited the Crossroads case, and basically
what the committee was suggesting is that, because of the
distribution scheme with respect to nonprofit corporations
under the Nonprofit Corporation Act, and pursuant to a DC
case, the Crossroads case, if a nonprofit corporation is
dissolved, then its assets, regardless of restriction, are
first distributed to pay the debts of the nonprofit
corporation and then to other charitable purposes. 
The problem, Your Honor, is that -- and I’m sure
Mr. Stang is aware of this -- that there is, in fact, Alaska
law that makes it very clear that the provisions of the
Nonprofit Corporation Act do not apply to religious
corporations unless specifically so provided in the statute,
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and we’ve cited a case to that effect, the -- we’ve cited the
statute, and so, Your Honor, that issue is a nonissue in this
case with respect to both best interests, absolute-priority
rule and the fair-and-equitable test.  
What I’d like to do is turn to the exhibit A of the
committee’s objection and go through some of their objections
that, Your Honor, do go to disclosure and for which -- those
that we will address in the disclosure statement and those
that we will not.  One is that we do not provide a liquidation
analysis, and that is correct, we did not provide a
liquidation analysis.  If that is a significant issue, then,
Your Honor, we are perfectly -- we’ll do a liquidation
analysis, and we will -- our liquidation analysis will be
consistent with the Teamsters case and the holding in that
case as to what assets would or would not be included with
respect to a liquidation, even though one could not occur in a
nonprofit.  
Also, Your Honor, the committee argues that certain
assets -- under the best-interest test, certain assets should
be included and their value wasn’t considered or there wasn’t
sufficient discussion of why we believed that they’re
restricted or, more importantly, I guess, the committee’s
position that they aren’t restricted.  To the extent that with
the plant fund and the current fund, if we need to do further
description of the fact that these constitute restricted
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funds, I think Mr. Bowder testified in the construction
hearing that when restricted donations are received, if they
are for the plant, for building purposes, they are put into
the plant fund, that is the way that they are kept and
invested, and also with respect to the current fund, that is
also where the CBNA puts both restricted and unrestricted
moneys.  If we need to put that description in there more
thoroughly, we can certainly do it. 
The next objection of the committee is that the plan
fail -- or the disclosure statement, and I’m not sure that
this is -- in fact, I don’t think it is a disclosure
objection, fails the fair-and-equitable test, and it, first of
all, alleges that the plan unfairly discriminates.  I believe,
Your Honor, that is absolutely a confirmation issue and not
one that this Court can determine at this stage.  And the
other one is that the debtor is arbitrarily withholding assets
that could be contributed, such as the rights to receive
assistance from other dioceses, ability to borrow against
properties to which no borrowing is proposed. 
Your Honor, let me address those.  Number 1, I think
the -- what I’ll call the “dialing for dollars,” for lack of a
better word, that the committee is criticizing the diocese for
not doing, number 1, is exactly the same argument that was
made in the Teamsters case and that was that, in fact, the
union had the ability to raise dues and therefore commit those
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to the payment of claims.  Again, I think that’s a
confirmation issue, but we will put in the disclosure
statement all the time that Bishop Kettler and Mr. Bowder have
spent pursuing other dioceses for loans or gifts in order to
be able to garner sufficient -- as much as possible in order
to fund this plan.  
To suggest that these people have been sitting up in
Fairbanks, Alaska, simply looking around and saying, “Well,
what do we have?” and, “Gee, that’s all we have, and there’s
nothing really else we can do,” simply is not true, Your
Honor, and we will put in a complete description of all the
time that is spent doing this and the result.  Believe me, if
the results had been significant, people would know about it,
and we’re still pursuing that, which is one of the reasons
why, in the plan and in the amended plan, there’s a provision
for either a sale of property that would require CBNA to
vacate its offices and try to find other space and lease it or
to be able to go out and find a loan, which they are
continuing to pursue.  
The other is that the debtor does not exercise its
power with respect to the endowment, and, again, Your Honor, I
think this is a confirmation issue, and the committee is
being, I think, rather generous, let’s say, in its reading of
the endowment documents in pulling out one little piece in
terms of whether or not the bishop can amend and the
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circumstances under which he can amend the documents.  Your
Honor, we believe that the law with respect to this issue is
pretty clear, and that is that this endowment is a trust and
an express trust that cannot be reached.  In any event, it is
a confirmation issue, and it is not a disclosure issue. 
If the committee wants a full recitation in the
disclosure statement of why it is we think that the
endowment -- a further recitation is not includable in
property that would be committed to the plan, we’re certainly
happy to put that in, and I’ll also put in a sentence that
says that the committee disputes that.  
With respect to the objection on the Alaska Shepherd
agreement, and it says, number 1, it’s unclear or disputes the
manner in which we propose that the Alaska Shepherd moneys
come in, and I will say that this change was made specifically
because of some concerns that we understood that there was on
the part of the committee with respect to a specific appeal
only for purposes of funding the settlement or the pool for
payment to tort claimants.  There was someplace in the
objection to the disclosure statement that we were now
criticized because we were limiting it to this and why weren’t
we doing a special appeal solely for purposes of funding the
plan for payment of tort claims.  
Your Honor, the committee just needs to tell us
what, in their view, do they believe is the most effective way
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to raise the most funds in order to fund that pool.  We may
not agree on the method, we may not agree on the split, and we
may not agree as to what the threshold is, and that may be
something you’ll have to decide at confirmation, but if
somebody wanted to pick up the phone and say, “You know what,
Susan, we don’t like this change quite the way it is; have you
thought about this?” that would be a constructive conversation
that ought to take place, Your Honor, and if that’s the case,
we’ll be happy to include something in the disclosure
statement.  
To the extent that we have to provide more
information with regard to the proposed sale to KNOM, which is
not selling it to ourselves, it is a management group
unaffiliated with CBNA, other than the fact that they have
run the radio station, we can certainly do that.  We have
investigated the radio station and the problems, given where
it is and the demographic and the audience that it reaches,
such as whether or not it actually could be more profitable as
a commercial with some religious aspects to it, and there are
some real problems with that, but if we need to put that in
the disclosure statement, we will, Your Honor.  I think the
committee is well aware of those issues because my memory
isn’t the greatest, but I believe that I have had some of
those conversations with Mr. Stang. 
One of the objections, Your Honor, is that there is
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no shared sacrifice and that we do not intend to eliminate
any current programs and instead increase funding to programs
and also to add programs.  Your Honor, if you read the
assumptions, which is really the business plan that is
attached to -- it’s actually attached to -- as part of
exhibit 7 in the disclosure statement, Your Honor, I think
it’s pretty clear that increased funding for programs,
expansion of programs and capital expenditures that are listed
here that the committee has so criticized CBNA for are to be
paid totally out of any restricted moneys that are given or
paid.  That’s what the column “temporarily restricted” means. 
To the extent that we need to have more clarity on
that, notwithstanding the provisions in the business plan that
talk about the fact that grant revenues will be sought and
that capital -- in fact, it says, “Capital project outlays
will be limited to grant and donation revenue received,” so
the suggestion that the diocese is going to be spending money
improving projects at the expense of what would otherwise go
to claimants, Your Honor, just is not correct.  I believe it’s
in there, but to the extent that we need to make it more
clear, we will do so. 
There is no description of the avoidance actions,
and we will, to the extent we need to, put in our position and
put in the committee’s position, so there, again, the
committee believes that there needs to be an estimate for
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claimant recoveries, and, as I’ve said, we will do that.  
They are also -- say that there is no disclosure of
how the sales of properties will occur, if there are sales,
and there actually are two contemplated potential sales.  One
is, Your Honor, the raffle that we’ve talked about.  That will
come before the Court on motion.  The other is the sales of
the properties that are listed on exhibit A to the plan, if
they cannot be financed.  We have absolutely no problem
bringing those property sales to the Court for approval with
notice to whatever entity post confirmation, post effective
date, is governing, so to the extent that’s an issue, we will
take care of that.  
There’s criticism that there -- because on the two
river lots we say we are going to give them back to the donor,
again, I am a little puzzled by the committee’s dispute about
that because that is another topic where I’ve had discussions
with Mr. Stang, as has Mr. Bowder, about the fact that when
the lots were donated or bequeathed to the diocese, the donors
retained the right to approve the purchasers of those lots if
those lots were sold, and we have been unable over years to
sell those lots or obtain approval.  If the committee has
another idea of what to do that they think can actually render
some value, then I suggest that they tell us about that. 
I did not understand the comment with respect to --
and this is on page 6, number 35 -- on the financial exhibits,
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it says that “the four-year go-forward projection purports to
include 2008 unaudited results, but the figures in the 6/30/08
column are approximately double the figures in the 12/31/08,
suggesting the two columns might be reversed.”  I don’t
understand that.  The diocese or CBNA is on a 6/30 fiscal
year, so you would expect that the numbers at 6/30 would be
higher than they were at 12/31, and maybe there was just some
confusion there.  To the extent we need to say that the CBNA
is on a fiscal year, then we will do so.  
Your Honor, the committee also says that they have
been thwarted in their efforts to discover or to be able to
analyze the financial condition of CBNA because we have
objected to their retention of their financial advisor, and,
Your Honor, once again, I am both puzzled and a little
disturbed by the suggestion that somehow or other the CBNA and
its attorneys have been less than cooperative with the
committee in terms of information, and I really do hate
situations, and I’m sure I could not hate them more than the
judges hate them, of the he said/she said, but when somebody
puts it in a pleading, I am going to respond, Your Honor.  
It has been about a year ago that we were requested
to provide documents to the committee regarding donations and
the endowment.  I personally was in Fairbanks.  I visited the
Fairbanks -- the offices.  I saw how the information was kept,
I saw the volume of the information and started discussions
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with the committee counsel with respect to the most economic
way to review those documents and provide them with everything
that they wanted.  In addition, they wanted information
regarding donors, and we asked for a confidentiality agreement
with them because the names of our donors, obviously there’s
an expectation that their names will not be out in the public
domain, and certainly what they have given and when they have
given.  
We looked back in our system, and the first time
that that confidentiality agreement was sent to the committee
was in September of ‘08.  It was not, Your Honor, until April
and May of this year that I would say the committee ramped up
and started requesting documents, and then we received the
document request that is attached to our objection to the
retention of their experts.  That matter is not before you
today, but let me tell you, the objection to the retention of
the expert was not an attempt to thwart the committee’s
ability to analyze the financial information which we have
been willing to give them for some period of time, Your Honor,
so to suggest that, had they had the information or had we
been cooperative, that their objections to the disclosure
statement may have been different or that somehow that would
have allowed them to do a more thorough job is not a problem
or cannot be laid at the feet of CBNA, Your Honor. 
With that, Your Honor, again, I think many of these
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issues are confirmation issues.  We’ve indicated which of
those issues we’ll address.  I don’t know how the Court wants
to handle that, if you want us to make the amendments and have
a continued hearing, which we will do expeditiously, or what
the Court’s desire is.  With that, Your Honor, I would reserve
time and also to the extent that there is specific insurance
issues that Mr. Ekberg is intending to raise, that Mr. Paige
would respond.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  Mr. Ekberg?  
MR. EKBERG:  Excuse me.  
(Pause)
MR. EKBERG:  Good morning, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Good morning. 
MR. EKBERG:  Charles Ekberg on behalf of the
Continental Insurance Company, one of the insurance
companies -- 
THE COURT:  Sir, Mr. Ekberg, I’m sorry you’ve had to
wait so long. 
MR. EKBERG:  No, that’s quite all right.  I am,
though, somewhat pleased to hear Ms. Boswell admit that the
disclosure statement was missing some things and needs some
cleaning up because these are the kind of things that normally
you would have hoped would have been resolved before we had to
come to court today, and it isn’t because people didn’t try,
and it’s unfortunate that we had to continue to file pleadings
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and come to court without being able to get these things
resolved.  
I think the first areas that she discussed, where we
argued that the disclosure statement is internally
inconsistent and ambiguous, hopefully she will address all of
those issues in some revised disclosure statement, and it
isn’t so much that things may not have been provided; it’s
because they even said -- for example, there are certain
instances when they talk about the compensation ranges in the
matrix where they said that information will be provided no
later than 10 days before the hearing on the disclosure
statement or in some cases where they talk about the fact that
the identity of the trustees will be made known before the
hearing on the disclosure statement.  That’s the part that
troubles us is when we point these things out and they didn’t
get addressed that we have to still file objections because
that is information which I believe is needed in order to make
a proper disclosure to the parties in the case and the parties
in interest. 
Again, the lack of the proper identity of the
assignee of the insurance actions, it seemed to be very all
over the place.  At one point it was the settlement trust, at
one point it was something called “the fund,” as if it had
some type of independent legal existence.  In some cases,
there’s even a reference in the plan to the fact that they’d
Case 08-00110    Doc 524    Filed 08/31/09    Entered 08/31/09 09:33:13    Desc Main





























be assigned to the committee.  These are the kinds of things
that should not have had to wait until a hearing to get
resolved.  
And who is the special arbitrator?  What
qualifications will he or she possess?  And given that
Rule 2002(b) does require at least 25 days’ notice of a
hearing on a disclosure statement, a lot of this stuff, even
when they said they were going to provide it on 10 days’
notice, wouldn’t have been sufficient under the rules to
provide for adequate notice for approving this disclosure
statement, which is what they’ve asked the Court to do.  
I remember when the concept of the disclosure
statement was first introduced as part of the 1978 Reform Act,
courts kind of struggled at first as to what would be a
disclosure statement, and it’s not surprising that you saw a
lot of early opinions -- the Stanley Hotel case, the Ligon
(ph) case, Cibatella (ph), that dealt with issues about what
should be in a disclosure statement, but then I think it’s
interesting, a lot of those cases you don’t see anymore.  And
why is that?  Because people realized that a disclosure
statement itself shouldn’t become an adversary proceeding.  It
should be a process in large part collaborative.  In fact, in
some districts, it’s required that counsel meet and confer
before a hearing simply to see how many of these issues can be
resolved without having to take up the Court’s time, and
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that’s what I had hoped that we would see in this case, but
unfortunately those errors have not been corrected, those
mistakes, and if they’re going to be, that’s fine, but I would
have hoped that they wouldn’t have come here today saying, you
know, approve our disclosure statement because it contains
adequate information.    
She has indicated that she will cover the
possibility that insurers would be parties in interest under
section 502, with the ability to object to claims, which is
fine, and that she will also include other information about
the trust agreements, I would hope, so parties can see just
exactly what it is since that’s going to -- mechanism is going
to be established, rather than just talk about it, and who the
assignee will be.  
Now let’s talk about the plan and the problems that
the insurers face or potential -- or possible insurers face. 
We believe that the plan may be patently unconfirmable on its
face because it may impair the rights of the insurance
parties, including Continental, to the extent it’s proven
there is an insurance policy, with respect to certain
provisions which would, in essence, waive the statute of
limitations on claims assigned to the trust.  This is
extremely puzzling because we understand there’s at least one
state court decision in this state where the statute of
limitations has been upheld as a defense, and you wonder why
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the debtor would then intentionally agree to waive it in all
other cases where people then want to go before a special
arbitrator, and it isn’t so much that that might violate the
cooperation clause as much as it also may violate the
provisions and policies which usually give the insurer the
ability to control the defense in settlement of the case.  
Also, there’s another provision in most policies
which does not obligate the insurer to indemnify or pay for
the damages until after a final judgment by trial or with
settlement approved by the insurer.  Those aspects are missing
from this plan.  
Now, to the extent that a debtor’s interest in
liability insurance policies becomes property of the estate
under 541(a), the nature and extent and existence of those
rights are still defined by applicable nonbankruptcy law or
state law.  Nothing -- you know, when the property comes into
the estate, it comes in with all the limitations and
restrictions and defenses that might have been available
outside bankruptcy as if the debtor had never filed.  Nothing
in the bankruptcy law changes those obligations or those
defenses or those interests, and that’s why most -- a lot of
the cases have held nothing in the bankruptcy code nor can the
bankruptcy court do anything to impair the rights of not only
the insurers but also the insureds under those policies if a
debtor wants to claim the benefits of those policies, and that
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is why in many cases -- and I -- most insurance companies,
most plans that involve insurance policies, will usually
contain some insurance neutrality language which was missing
here, which basically says all defenses, rights and
obligations of the parties are preserved notwithstanding
confirmation of the plan, so that if the case is going forward
and the insurers are being asked to participate or defend or
do anything, those rights that they had under nonbankruptcy
law will still be preserved.
And the bankruptcy estate, of course, has no greater
rights in those interests than the debtor had prepetition when
it comes in under section 540(a)(1), and most policies will
contain provisions, as I indicated, that the insurer will have
the right to control the investigation and settlement and
defense of the claim.  They condition payment of claims on a
final judgment against the insured after an actual trial, not
a mediation or an arbitrator, and require the insured to
cooperate and in many cases preclude the assignment of
interest in the policies without the insured’s consent.  
Now, in this case, we have two adversary proceedings
currently pending before you, one of which we call the policy
existence case and one which we call the insurance coverage
action where issues relating to coverages defenses, existence
of policies, will be determined.  We believe the proper place
for any issues relating to those will be in those adversary
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proceedings and would not -- should not be part of any
confirmation process, as the debtor would propose in its plan,
and that’s what makes the plan basically unconfirmable is it’s
asking the bankruptcy court for, in essence, an advisory
opinion that somehow the waiver of the statute of limitations
won’t affect the ability to claim coverage under any of the
policies or give the insurers a defense to payment of any
claims.  Those are issues that I think are best reserved and
are reserved, in fact, to the extent they exist and will
exist, in the insurance coverage action or the policy
existence cases.  
I was also curious about Ms. Boswell’s comments. 
There are statements in the latter part of the proposed
disclosure statement which paint a very one-sided picture of
the debtor’s claims against Continental and Continental’s
alleged responses.  It’s one thing for a disclosure statement
to indicate and contain adequate information, but that has to
be based on fact, not argument or opinion.  If the debtor
wants to make those arguments, they should be labeled as such
and not appear as they do as if they were statements of fact,
and I -- if she’s not willing to do that, then I would also
ask for opportunity for rebuttal with the idea that we can
present our arguments, as well, but simply to state that
Continental -- the case had to be filed because Continental
wouldn’t contribute or Continental wouldn’t settle, those are
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opinions, and they should be labeled as such and not simply
made to appear as if they were absolute statements of fact,
which is what the problem is in the current disclosure
statement.  
In the reply brief which we received last night,
debtor takes issue with some of the interpretations of
whether or not certain defenses would be available to insurers
under Alaska law, under the cooperation clause or the
settlement clause.  I’m not prepared to discuss the insurance
defense issues in detail -- Mr. Nash, my co-counsel, is, if
necessary -- but we believe that the debtor’s reply misstates
and does not fully state Alaska law on all of those issues. 
If the Court believes that those issues relating to whether or
not an insured can settle without the consent of insurer or 
whether that means the insurer has no further obligation or no
further right to seek a review of that settlement is material
to its decisions today, we would request the opportunity to
file, with authorities and short summary of our arguments in
response to those, because we do not believe that they’re
accurate.  
It is true that the Great Divide case cited by them
recognized that if an insured settles after a breach of duty
to defend, the insurer is not precluded from litigating
defenses it relied upon in coverage or challenging the
reasonableness of the settlement, but if the Court wants to
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get into a discussion of Alaska insurance law, we would
request the opportunity to file a short reply to the arguments
raised by the debtor’s counsel in the reply we received last
night.  
And with that, we will request that we will rely on
our submission.  
THE COURT:  Thank you, Mr. Ekberg.  Mr. Orgel? 
MR. ORGEL:  Thank you, Your Honor.  Robert Orgel,
Pachulski Stang, for the committee.  
Your Honor, the committee opposes approval of the
debtor’s disclosure statement.  The two strictly legal grounds
are the underlying plan is unconfirmable and disclosure is
inadequate.  But practically, as well, Judge, this plan will
not lead to a conclusion of the case or to a consensual
reorganization, and that’s probably the biggest problem. 
Moreover, with the acknowledged supplements that the debtor
has indicated it would be making, in any event, we’d all need
to see it again with a liquidation analysis, with a -- some
kind of an analysis of what creditors would get, have an
understanding of those really key fundamental disclosures
which is normally what you’d be talking about here are those
two big disclosures.  What do people get?  What’s the
liquidation amount?  
Your Honor, the best way to move this case forward,
the best way, is to deny this disclosure statement approval
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motion outright, slow the plan process while granting the
standing motion.  Your Honor, if we get to a confirmation
hearing at which all issues will be decided, all parties will
be spending a lot of money preparing on a lot of issues to
litigate each one.  Is the endowment separate, as the debtor
alleges?  Are the funds alleged to be in the endowment, do
they belong there, because, factually, what are the donor’s
right on -- what was the donor intent?  Does the debtor, even
if all that’s true, have a good-faith obligation to try and
make some of that asset available to creditors?  
Restricted funds, very similar.  Under law, in this
context, are they available or are they not available?  To
what extent are they available?  Factually, are the funds
alleged to be restricted funds which really determines what
creditors get?  I mean, that’s what we’re talking about, how
much is available for creditors.  We’d have to look and see
how much is available for creditors.  Factually, are these
properly denominated as restricted funds?  And, again, even if
that’s the case, we’d have to walk through to see does the
debtor have an obligation to try and make some of these funds
available to creditors.  
And, Your Honor, as discussed as to the parish
properties, are they already assets of the estate the value of
which would have to be made available to creditors?  The
argument for that which we’ve set forth is the argument that
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the parishes aren’t separate entities.  That would have to be
addressed because if that -- those assets are available, then
they become part of the best-interest analysis.  The -- so
this would be, again, an issue for confirmation.  And
separately, even if the parishes are separate, then as
Mr. Stang walked through, we’d have to get to the issue of
whether the claims, the avoidance claims, if there were a
resulting trust -- first, we’d have to look at that, express
trust, resulting trust -- if there were resulting trust in
favor of a separate parish, what’s the value of the avoidance
claims?  Are those values being put on the table?  To analyze
the best-interest analysis, we’d have to get there.  One way
or another we’d have to get there. 
So, Your Honor, either we’d go through all
these steps, and there are really more issues -- maybe I
should mention RFRA -- we’d have to confront RFRA at the
confirmation hearing.  We’d have to confront the issue of how
this is getting funded and how the diocese is going to provide
a third-party discharge to parishes, which is what it
mentioned -- parishes would contribute and get a discharge. 
If they’re separate, are they getting a discharge?  Can you do
that in the Ninth Circuit or not?  It goes on and on.  This
confirmation hearing, Your Honor, would have as many heads as
the mythical Hydra.  This would be a difficult hearing and one
where all of these major issues would have to be addressed,
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and it would assure one thing, Your Honor -- no settlement.
How could there be a settlement?  You’re facing all
the issues at one time, and you’re getting one answer.  Yes,
no.  It’s an up-or-down vote.  That’s what they’re teeing up. 
Why?  The only way, Your Honor, that that would be cheaper
than hitting these issues one -- at least hitting a major
issue first, the only way it would be cheaper is if the
parties don’t get a chance to prepare, if things go quickly
enough that nobody really gets a chance to get these issues
out.  Otherwise, it’s not going to be cheaper.   
THE COURT:  What’s going on out there?  
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  The maintenance is doing
something (indiscernible).
THE COURT:  Could you ask them to stop?  
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:  (Indiscernible).  
THE COURT:  My apologies.  
MR. ORGEL:  Would you like me to wait, Your Honor,
or keep going? 
THE COURT:  No, go ahead.  
MR. ORGEL:  Okay.  Your Honor, on the other hand,
the good news is that unlike the mythical Hydra whose head
kept growing back, once you cut these off, they’re done.  Once
we hit an issue and it gets resolved by Your Honor, it’s done,
or once we get far enough that there’s a signal on that issue,
it’s done.  The committee believes that’s the smartest way to
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go, that instead, that just teeing up the parish property
issue alone, as to both the avoidance issues, as to the
separateness, distinctness, of the parishes, whether it be as
to test cases or otherwise, doing that would do far more in a
much more cost-effective way to move this case forward.  
Ms. Boswell talked about leverage.  I don’t
understand that.  This is -- we’re talking about coming to
Your Honor and asking for a ruling on an important issue, just
not asking for a ruling on every important issue at the same
time.  That’s the way a lot of these get moved forward. 
Otherwise, we aren’t going to be in a position to ever
separately consider them, and you’re -- we’re going to be 
spending a lot -- preparing for a lot of issues that really
wouldn’t have to be spent -- money wouldn’t have to spent on
if we hit the big issue first and get an answer.  
Your Honor, in all events, at the most, the debtor
should be obliged to remedy the disclosure inadequacies and
give the parties a chance to respond.  The debtor’s reply
attempts to rely in large part on the Teamsters Union case,
and there are certainly similarities.  
THE COURT:  Excuse me just a second. 
MR. ORGEL:  Sure.  
THE COURT:  Yeah, this is Judge MacDonald.  I’m
talking to our telephonic friends.  If you have a mute button,
please use the mute button, because we are getting a fair
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amount of noise in the courtroom.  Thank you very much.  Go
ahead. 
MR. ORGEL:  Sure.  Your Honor, while there are
certainly similarities with the Teamsters Union case, and we
did cite the case below, and it’s true, we probably should
have cited the other case because it’s certainly relevant
authority, but we didn’t challenge it.  This isn’t the
confirmation hearing.  What the debtor misapprehends about the
committee’s approach here is the committee didn’t come out and
say -- we didn’t say it violates the absolute-priority rule,
which is the key holding there as to how that works in charity
situation.  We didn’t challenge that.  
We said fair-and-equitable has got to mean more, and
we cited cases -- we cited authorities and cited from cases
saying it means more than that, and, in fact, the Teamsters
case supports that it means more than that.  If factually
found, it went into they asked members to try and get dues a
number of years before, it was unsuccessful, this was evidence
that they did all they could to bring in the assets.  It says
specifically that all the real and personal property asset
values were provided to creditors, other than two assets,
which was they didn’t go for members’ dues and they explained
why, and the collective bargaining agreement they said had no
value because it was unassignable, but they went through that
analysis.  
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The committee’s point was here are all these places,
and we went through them, where money -- attempts could be
made to bring money in.  Where’s the effort?  Where’s the
good-faith effort on the part of a debtor to show that it’s
really trying to put in front of the creditors all the assets
it could?  We certainly appreciate that there’s some effort
here.  It’s not we’re saying there’s none; we’re saying there
needs -- there are a lot of assets that were just being said,
well, it’s an excluded asset.  If we have any basis for
telling you you can’t get an asset, it’s not available. 
Whether that be because we’re going to say it’s protected
through RFRA, whether that’s -- for the schools, whether
that’s going to be because we say it’s an endowment so the
only thing we’re going to do is change the formula by a
percent that a lot of institutions apparently are doing at
this point because they might not have any income off these
for a bit, (indiscernible) no explanation of why they’re not
doing more, no even addressing it.  We think they needed to do
that.  That was our point for a disclosure hearing as opposed
to a confirmation hearing.  At a confirmation hearing, though,
the rest of these issues will come up.  
The -- you know, another note in the Teamsters Union
case there, Your Honor, the growers in that case got a
$527,000 judgment, and the plan offered them $300,000 plus.  I
don’t know that we’re looking at the same return.  And we
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certainly -- maybe I should stick to -- I don’t know if we’re
looking at the same return, maybe that should have been my
emphasis because we don’t have the chart, the exhibit, that
gives tort claimants an idea of what they’d get based on their
claims.  And I understand that’s a difficult thing to do at
this point.  There’s going to be uncertainties, but I think
the debtor is committed they will try and do something.  
In that context, Your Honor, I’d note the statute-
of-limitations defense has to be addressed because who’s going
to choose settlement if they find out that, wait a minute,
that’s going to be an issue even in how much they get in a
settlement.  That may really affect who’s going to make those
choices.  So we do need to see again what -- the debtor says
they’re going to provide a chart.  We need to see that before
this could go forward, in all events.  
Your Honor, when we say all this, that there has to
be an effort, as I noted, debtor’s response seems to be, well,
we don’t have to provide these assets and here’s why.  Your
Honor, that isn’t right, and it can’t be right, and the debtor
argues that granting standing on the avoidance action will
cost the estate more.  As we’ve said, setting this course on
the plan confirmation is just going to lead to the higher cost
and the protracted litigation.  The debtor could only get this
through by -- and would only get leverage by giving -- would
get leverage by having a condensed hearing.  It’s only by
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having a full hearing they wouldn’t.  It would be less costly
to do it separately.  
The -- Your Honor, and for a liquidation analysis,
as well -- I want to go through some of these individual
items -- the debtor has said they’d do a liquidation analysis,
but they’re going to exclude certain items.  Since they’re
disputed, they should include the values.  Whether they then
drop them to a bottom line as to their belief as to whether
they’d be available is a separate question.  They could do it
separately.  But for disclosure, they should be disclosing the
values that either are available or that may be available
because if they don’t do that, how do people make informed
decisions?  The disclosure should be there of all the key
values.  Certainly, it can be the debtor’s valuation and we
can deal with that, but there has to be some disclosure of the
values, included and excluded, that are under discussion.  
As well, Your Honor, comparative projections are
needed showing historical and go-forward numbers.  Your Honor,
exhibit 8 to the disclosure statement does that for the
schools.  It has the unaudited numbers from 2008 and it has
go-forward numbers.  Exhibit 7, which appears to do it for the
rest of the diocese doesn’t.  It really needs the same thing
so that there’s in effect a baseline to see -- so you can see
what’s being -- what was done and what’s being proposed.  
As well, Your Honor, I note on the comment about a
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financial advisor, I think Ms. Boswell pointed out that the
fiscal year end for the diocese is 6/30 and that’s why the
6/30 numbers were higher than the 12/31.  Perhaps that would
have been either evident or readily ascertainable by a
financial advisor, but we don’t have one, so you had a lawyer
looking at it saying why is 6/31 [sic] number higher than
12 -- I mean, 6/30 numbers higher than 12/31 and raising that
that may be an error.  We didn’t -- I don’t think anywhere --
narratively, we didn’t mention it, we put that as an error
that should be looked at and corrected.  We’re now
understanding that it’s because of the fiscal year end, but it
only points out that’s only one place.  We really need a
financial advisor to help us make sure for creditors that the
financial information being provided is adequate and is clear
and provides the necessary disclosure to enable and inform the 
vote which is the key to this process.  
And if RFRA is to be asserted, Your Honor, at
confirmation to justify exclusion of the schools or any other
values, the debtor should disclose more on its analysis, its
reasoning, the alternatives it considered.  That is the burden
under Ninth Circuit law, and the disclosure should be there. 
This is an unusual case with -- it’s going to have -- as I
say, it’s going to be a Hydra of a sort at confirmation, but
the way to address it, the way to narrow this and clarify it
is to provide the disclosure that helps people understand what
Case 08-00110    Doc 524    Filed 08/31/09    Entered 08/31/09 09:33:13    Desc Main





























the issues are before they’re coming up.  
Your Honor, as to the Alaskan Shepherd agreement,
I was a little confused by comments made because I don’t
think -- and it could be that we just weren’t clear as to what
our issue was.  Our issue was that debtor proposes that
there’s this sharing arrangement but puts two holes in it and
says there’s a sharing arrangement, but before we start
sharing, we’re going to take off the top an operating reserve
and an agreed minimum.  Okay, but no estimates, no -- we have
no idea what we’re talking about and how that gets -- what the
process is for getting resolved and thus what the proceeds
expected from this sharing arrangement are.  
That was our point is there needs to be estimates
there.  Even if the estimates are arranged, even if the
estimates are just that, there needs to be something,
otherwise, how do you come to a conclusion as to whether this
is a fair effort?  If the reserve is high enough, if the
agreed minimum is high enough, then nothing comes out of this
arrangement at all, so we need an understanding on that, Your
Honor.  
We appreciate the offers of Ms. Boswell to
supplement the disclosure.  We accept all of those.  We’re
thrilled to see more disclosure.  I don’t want to leave it
unclear that we -- to say to the extent there was an offer, to
the extent the committee’s being asked would you want that
Case 08-00110    Doc 524    Filed 08/31/09    Entered 08/31/09 09:33:13    Desc Main





























disclosure, absolutely, but the -- you know, one thing I
thought was a little telling for us, Your Honor, was in the
reply about the Alaskan law permitting self-settled trusts,
spendthrift trusts, and that the spendthrift trust law
applies -- somehow shields all of the endowments.  
Whether accurate or not on this narrow point is not
something I’m going to try to discuss after reading it for the
first time yesterday, but the bigger picture this suggests is
troubling because all of what the debtor does, all of what
they do, is arguably religious or charitable, I mean,
presumably is religious or charitable.  Yet -- and this is a
formidable enterprise with a lot of expenses and expenditures
and people who are affected by its operations.  Can it really
organize itself so virtually all of its available assets
could -- even if they’re not -- could be put -- shielded from
creditors?  Is that what it’s saying, that really they could
take -- get -- solicit money to put into a separate place
where they can run their operations and never have that money
touched, so even if operations, even if the plumber demands
money, you can’t access it unless they agree to pay it because
the money has been solicited for charitable purposes and set
aside (indiscernible).  Something’s wrong with all that, and I
thought this is really no way to get at this, and I think
thankfully the bankruptcy law does afford us a side door, a
couple of side doors through which to get at the question.  
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In the committee’s objection, we cite the Walker
case, and at page 8 of that case there’s a short quotation,
one sentence.  “The failure of a debtor to use the full reach
of its disposable resources to repay creditors is evidence
that a plan is not proposed in good faith.”  Similarly, Your
Honor, the Montgomery (indiscernible) Department case cited by
the committee states that the fair-and-equitable rule --
states at page 24 of that case that the fair-and-equitable
rule requires that, quote, “for an unsecured class, the
percentage or formula for proposed payment has to demonstrate
a good-faith effort to repay those obligations.”  
Your Honor, where we stand now the disclosure
statement should not be approved.  Thank you. 
THE COURT:  Thank you.  Ms. Boswell -- well, first
of all, are there any parties appearing on the phone that wish
to make some comments relative to the disclosure statement?  
MR. POMPEO:  Your Honor, Michael Pompeo on behalf of
Travelers. 
THE COURT:  Go right ahead, Mr. Pompeo.  
MR. POMPEO:  Thank you, Your Honor.  Your Honor, I
know we’ve been going at this for quite some time.  I will be
brief.  
Your Honor, at the very outset of this hearing,
Ms. Boswell said that everyone would agree that these cases
are difficult.  Well, I think with regard to the insurers,
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that may not be the case and that actually, Your Honor, the
debtor is actually making these cases more difficult than they
need be.  I know Mr. Ekberg, on behalf of Continental, had
forwarded to Ms. Boswell some insurance neutrality language
which certainly would have simplified these cases vis-a-vis
the insured.  It may not resolve all the issues, but it
certainly would go a long way.  
I was -- instead of putting in those insurance
neutrality language, she’s intending that insurance coverage
issues be decided at the confirmation hearing, and I was
listening here when Ms. Boswell was giving her presentation of
all the issues that she was reserving for confirmation, and,
quite frankly, Your Honor, I ran out of room on my pad.  A lot
of these issues, especially with regard to the insurers, would
go away, and, Your Honor, I don’t think that having the
insurance coverage litigation litigated here at confirmation
is appropriate.  The Court’s already made a determination that
the insurance coverage litigation itself is (indiscernible),
and that’s where those issues should be resolved, and with
that, Your Honor, I will -- that’s all I have, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  Thank you very much, Mr. Pompeo.  How
much do you have?  
MS. BOSWELL:  Very little, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Let’s go ahead. 
MS. BOSWELL:  Your Honor, first of all, with respect
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to the insurance, there is a basic disagreement, obviously,
with respect to insurance neutrality, but I think there may be
some confusion because it is not -- and to the extent that
there was a suggestion that there was an intent to circumvent
the adversary by virtue of confirmation, that is not the case. 
If the insurers believe that the possibility of an assignment
would do that, I don’t believe that that is the case, but to
that extent, I guess perhaps Mr. Ekberg and Mr. Pompeo and
Mr. Paige and I can talk off line and we can figure out where
the confusion seems to lie.  We have a schedule that the Court
has set, and we intend to proceed with the adversaries as the
Court has set them, so I guess now I’m confused as to why
there’s confusion, but to the extent that we need to
straighten that out, we can do that.  
With respect to the comments of Mr. Ekberg with
respect to statute of limitations and other things such as
that, again, Your Honor, I don’t think those are issues of
disclosure, and I believe I have taken care of Continental’s
issues with respect to disclosure.  Also, with respect to the
issue of the application of the Great Barrier case and the
other legal issues that Mr. Ekberg addressed, again, we
presented the Great Barrier case in response to their
suggestion that the controlling law was this bankruptcy case
out of Pennsylvania.  I think everybody will agree that the
rights and obligations under these contracts are probably
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going to be determined under state law, so I see no reason to
allow additional briefing, and I’m sure that those issues will
come up in due time.  
With respect to Mr. Orgel’s comments, it sounded
to me like we were going to re-argue the avoidance action
motion again, and I guess, number 1, I have a very basic
disagreement, and Mr. Orgel said something that was very
telling in the context of let the avoidance actions go forward
and not confirmation because, for some reason or another,
that’s going to be simpler because, after all, we are going to
have to determine, as well, whether or not the parishes are
property of the estate in that context.  That is contrary to
what Mr. Stang argued earlier with respect to the avoidance
action motion, and, Your Honor, I think that Mr. Orgel’s
characterization of it is probably, frankly, the accurate one
in terms of what will have to be determined if that goes
forward.  
The plan, Your Honor, I believe, the debtor
believes, is the best way to move this case forward and
whether or not it means that this Court then sits for
however many days in confirmation or we set a schedule for
how these issues are going to be resolved, then, you know,
unfortunately, so be it.  It will either result in a
resolution of this case or it will result in this Court
determining whether or not in the first contested confirmation
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of a diocese, the plan can be confirmed as it is ultimately
presented to the Court for confirmation.  
We were, in one sense, if I recall correctly,
faulted for not going forward with the plan.  Now we’re being
faulted for trying to go forward with the plan.  Your Honor,
the fact is that this case needs resolution.  Whether it’s
resolution by the Court or whether it’s resolution
consensually, it needs resolution.  To not move forward with
confirmation is not going to advance the ball for any of us.  
I understand the risk.  My client understands risk. 
Mr. Stand understands risk, Mr. Orgel does.  We all have risks
by virtue by having confirmation go forward, and we understand
that, but there is no alternative at this point.  That is not
a disclosure issue.  That is not a reason not to confirm or
approve the disclosure statement, Your Honor.  With some
limited changes, that disclosure statement is -- contains
adequate information, and we will provide the information that
we said we would, and if Mr. Orgel thinks that we need to
include the fact that under binding Ninth Circuit law the
things he is talking about need to be included are not
included, we’ll include that, as well. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MS. BOSWELL:  With that, Your Honor, we would ask
that we be given an opportunity to make some of these
changes -- 
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THE COURT:  Okay, we’ll -- 
MS. BOSWELL:  -- submit them back to the Court.  
THE COURT:  Right.  Let’s hold off on your changes
until I’ve ruled on the UCC’s motion to commence actions --  
MS. BOSWELL:  Okay.  
THE COURT:  -- until I’ve ruled on Continental’s and
the debtor’s motion for summary judgment -- 
MS. BOSWELL:  Okay.  
THE COURT:  -- and until I can give you a punch list
of the items in the disclosure statement that need to be
changed.
MS. BOSWELL:  Very well, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  And so this -- I want to get this
case moving, I know you do, I know that Mr. Stang does and
Mr. Orgel and everyone here.  I think that’s the best way to
do it, and so it will be a little prolonged, but we’ll --
there’ll be more information available, and we’ll know at
least some of these issues will have some resolution.  Okay? 
MS. BOSWELL:  Very well, Your Honor.  I will hold
off, and I think that hearing is June 30th -- 
THE COURT:  30th. 
MS. BOSWELL:  -- as I recall. 
THE COURT:  That’ll be in 12 days.  
MS. BOSWELL:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  Great.  
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MS. BOSWELL:  Very well.  Okay.  
THE COURT:  Well, any comments from anybody? 
Mr. Stang?  Any comments from our friends on the phone?  I
take it not.  Then the disclosure statement is taken under
advisement, and the Court will issue a written decision with
regard to it, and thank you all very much.  Court is now
adjourned.  
(Proceedings concluded at 12:04:22 p.m.)   
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